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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite some evidence pointing to its effectiveness,' the high hopes for
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 are as yet unfulfilled. Very simply,
sex segregation' of the work force has not decreased measurably in the last
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University Law School-Newark. B.A. 1964,
Swarthmore College: LL.B. 1968, Yale University: Attorney for plaintiff, Tornkins v.
Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1976).
I particularly wish to thank Geraldine E. 0' Kane for all her assistance
throughout this project. I also wish to thank Alfred Blumrosen, Ruth Blumrosen,
Jonathan Hyman, and Susan Ross for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article, and I am also indebted to my research assistant Sara Chrisman and to the
students in the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School who partici-
pated in the Tomkins litigation.
' See generally Kahne. Economic. Research on Women and Families, 3 SIGNS 652
(1978) and authorities cited therein.
42 U.S.C.	 2000e to e l5 (1970), as amended by Equal Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub.	 No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, codified at 42 U.S.C. 	 2000e to ell
(Stipp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
3 Throughout this article, data and examples arc drawn primarily from the
area of sex discrimination. This relates in part to the special nature of sex discrimina-
3 4 5
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decade. 4
 Women continue to be clustered in low-paying, low prestige jobs, 8
while white males continue to dominate the more lucrative, challenging and
responsible occupations.
Job 'segregation harms both the individual and society. Individuals are
stifled in their quest for self-fulfillment, while society loses the special con-
tribution those persons could have made. On an economic level, the striking
wage differentials associated with job segregation have a devastating impact
on women workers, and particularly on female single parents. 8 Fifteen years
after the enactment of the Equal Pay Act' and Title VII, women earn on the
average only 58% of what men do, a smaller percentage than in 1964. 8
When all factors other than sex are separated out, women workers earn con-
siderably less than comparably situated men. 9
 Such wage differentials ensure
tion which has depended so greatly on internalized controls, but it is also a matter of
readability. While the case is not made here, the theory proposed is fully applicable to
other types of discrimination.
ln fact, the proportion of occupations with a high female concentration (70
to 90 percent) as well as those with a high male concentration, have steadily increased
over the last thirty years. Laws, Psychological Dimensions of Labor Force Participation by
Women, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 60 (P. Wallace, ed.
1976). More than one-quarter of all women workers work in jobs that are 95% or
more female, and over three-fifths of all women work in jobs that are at least 75%
female. U.S. Department of Labor, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, 89-91
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS]. In 1978, the
United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded that at least one-third of the
minority males and two-thirds to three-fourths of the majority females would have to
change their occupations in order for their groups to have occupational distributions
similar to the majority males. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF
EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN, 45-46 (1978).
For example, in 1973 nearly two-fifths of all women workers were
employed as secretaries, retail trade salesworkers. bookkeepers, private household
workers, elementary school teachers, waitresses, typists, cashiers, seamstresses and
stitchers, and registered nurses. 1975 HANDBOOK ON kl'omes; WORKERS. supra note 4 at
91.
" In 1973, single parent families headed by a woman aged 25-44 had an
average income of only $5,951 per year compared to an income of $11,931 for
families headed by a similarly situated man. H. Ross & 1. SAWI111.1., TiME or TRANSI-
TION: Toe GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY WOMEN 10 (1975).
29 U.S.C.	 206 (d)(1),
8
 Table prepared by Women's Bureau. U.S. Department of Labor, Fully
Employed Women Continue to Earn Less Than Fully Employed Men of Either White
or Minority Races (Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D,C.,
August 1978).
" For example, one study concluded that in 1971 the woman worker re-
ceived an average of $3,458 less income than comparably situated men, solely because
of her sex, i.e., $3,458 less than she should have received on the basis of achievement,
factors of education, tenure with one's employer, tenure on one's specific job with that.
employer, number of hours worked each week, amount of supervisory responsibility,
and occupational prestige. Levitin, Quinn & Staines, Sex Discrimination Against the.
American Working Woman, 15 AM. BED. Sca. 237, 245 (1971), Similarly, The 1973 Report
of Me President's Council of Economic Advisors calculated the gross earnings differential
due to sex discrimination at approximately 20%, Bergman & Adelman, The 1973 Re-
port of the President's Council of Economic. Advisors: The Economic. Role of Women, 63 Am.
Ec. Rev, 509 (1973). See also Buckley, Pay Differences Between Men and Women in the
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that Women will be dependent on and subservient to men, 10 and they pre-
clude tolerating labor market segregation under some unexpressed "separate
but equal" rubric. It may have been assumed that wage differentials would be
reduced gradually as Title VIPs proscription of discriminatory practices al-
lowed members of the protected classes to move into positions formerly re-
served for white men." But the walls have not tumbled down—even though
legal developments now permit systemic attacks. 12
In the face of the persistent wage differentials associated with continued
job segregation, some advocates have sought to attack wage inequities directly.
Thus, under the slogan, "equal pay for equal value," it is argued that women
grouped in typically female jobs should receive pay equal to that received by
men holding male jobs where their work involves equivalent skill, effort, re-
sponsibility, and working conditions. 13
There is a sound theoretical basis for this approach. As Professor Ruth
Blumrosen has demonstrated," where jobs are, or were, segregated by race
Same Job, 94 MoNTnt.v LAR. REP. 36-39 (1971); Flanders & Anderson, Sex Discrimination
in Employment: Theory and Practice, 26 1Nn. & LAB. REL. Rev. 938 (1973); U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, REP. 417 SELECTED EARNINGS AND DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF UNION MEMBERS (1970).
10
 See Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex, WOMEN AND
THE WORKPLACE 137 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan, ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
HARTMANN].
" See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4(11 U.S. 424 (1971).
1 ' See Gilt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protec-
tion under Title VII. 8 Lov. CHI. L. J. 723 (1977). Attempts to include equal pay fur jobs
of equal value have failed under the Equal Pay Act because of the courts narrow
interpretation of the language of the Equal Pay Act which requires equal pay 'Tor
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(I). Although the jobs in question need not be identical, they must he substan-
tially equal. Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1974): Hodgson v.
Corning Glass Works. 474 F.2d 226 (2c1 Cir. 1973).
Plaintiffs attempting to secure relief from sex biased wage rates under Tide VII
have generally been unsuccessful because the courts have construed the Bennett
Amendment to Tide VII as restricting Title VII claims to those recognized under the
Equal Pay Act. Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 411 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975):
Ammons v. ZIA Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). But see Fitzgerald v. Sirkin Stock-
ade, 22 FEP Gas. 266 (1201 Or. 1980) (finding of sex discrimination in compensation
in violation of Title VII does not violate Equal Pay Act or the Bennett Amendmeni
although discrimination was not within scope of Equal Pay Act). The language of the
Bennett Amendment provides that:
It shall not be an unlawful practice under this subchapter
	 any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees if' such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of' Title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The problem with this interpretation of this amendment is
that it ignores the fact That differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act only
when the wage differential is pursuant to a merit or seniority system. There is no
affirmative mandate in the Equal Pay Act authorizing unequal pay for jobs of compar-
able value.
14 Bluturosen, Wage Discrimination Resulting From Job Segregation As a Violation
of Title VII, 12 MICH. J. OE LAW REFORM 397 (1979).
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or sex, the same discriminatory considerations that influenced initial job as-
signments and restrictions on transfer or promotion also influenced the rates
of pay. 15 Therefore, where jobs have been restricted to minorities or women,
the rate of pay for these jobs has been discriminatorily depressed. Thus, it is
appropriate to provide redress for such inequities in pay under our fair
employment laws. Unfortunately, however, courts have thus far declined to
accept the principle that workers are entitled to equal pay for work of equal
value," despite some favorable precedent provided by decisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission."
15
 For example, as Professor Blumrosen points out, in job evaluation systems
used to establish wage rates, the ranking of compensable factors to determine the
"value" of a particular job can reflect the attitudes and values of the committee mem-
bers assessing the factors. This is particularly true where the worth of jobs' is pegged to
the wage rates in key jobs which are male or female oriented. In addition, jobs are
"valued" in relation to the community wage structure which reflects market bias. See
Wage Discrimination, supra note 14 at 428-444. The National War Labor Board recog-
nized the bias inherent in job evaluation systems in General Electric Co. and Westing-
house Electric Corp., 28 BNA WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1945) and required higher pay for
women in women's jobs whose pay had been undervalued pursuant to such systems.
The board noted that Westinghouse utilized an evaluation system wherein
Each labor grade carries a range of point value, and any job falling within
that range of point value is automatically paid the wage rate for that labor
grade. There are, however, separate key sheets for men and women, the
effect of which is that labor grades carrying the same point value pay two
different sets of wage rates.
Id. at 678-79.
The General Electric scheme was more explicit. For female operators, the value of
their jobs was set at two-thirds the value of adult male workers. Id. at (581.
While evaluation systems today no longer utilize separate sheets for men and
women, the problem of underevaluation remains due to the evaluation of jobs against
key, jobs which continue to be male or female oriented.
16
 See Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (wage differ-
ential between predominantly male job categories and predominantly female job
categories does not violate Title VII although employer had objectively valuated jobs
as involving comparable worth); Lemons v. City and County of Denver. 17 EP' Gas.
906 (D. Colo. 1978), qg 'd 620 F.2cl 228 (10th Cir. 1980) (no Title VII violation where
female dominated occupation paid less than male dominated occupation where pay
differential due to historical and market reasons): Tacoma Pierce County Public
Health Employees Ass . n v. Tacoma Pierce County Health Dep't., City of Tacoma, 586
P.2d 1215 (Wash. App. 1978) (Washington state fair employment law, like Title VII,
does not reach comparable worth cases). But see Gunther v. County of Washington.
602 F.2c1 882 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VI I's prohibition of discrimination in compensation
is broader than that of Equal Pay Act despite Bennett Amendment).
' 7
 See E.E.O.C. DEc. No. AU7-173 (April 25. 1968) (unpublished decision on
File at the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic, Rutgers School of Law, Newark, New
Jersey) in which the charging party worked for a cafeteria chain in the female job
classification of head of the pantry. The two other areas of employment in the
cafeteria, the kitchen and bake shop, were classified as male jobs. The charging party,
as "head salad lady," not only was paid less than the heads of the kitchen and the hake
shop, but less than all the other male workers with the exception of one man in an
entry level helper position. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that the
respondent had violated Title VII by establishing "separate and different wage rate
schedules for male employees on the one hand and females doing reasonably compar-
able work." The Commission made similar rulings regarding black workers in E.E.O.C.
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As advocates of "equal pay for equal value" continue to address the prob-
lem of wage inequities, it is essential to identify and eliminate those barriers to
equal employment opportunity that continue to confine workers to particular
occupations according to their sex. In addressing that task, this article first
reviews pertinent social science data-regarding the causes of occupational dis-
crimination in general and job segregation in particular. While those causes
are not completely understood, it is apparent that attitudinal factors figure
significantly on both the supply and demand sides of the picture. Employers'
preconceived notions of appropriate role behavior influence the definition of
jobs, the evaluation of work performance, and the assignment of workers to
jobs, thus detracting from the maximal contribution that the individual
worker's abilities would allow. At the same time, employer and society role
expectations of women have a negative impact on a woman's motivation and
performance in a work environment. Thus, the first section concludes that
attitudinal factors internalized by both employer and employee constitute a
primary obstacle to equal employment opportunity, and that such attitudinal
factors are reinforced continually by adverse employment decisions grounded
in stereotypical role expectations. The first section of this article proposes that
such stereotypically based decisions be recognized under our fair employment
laws as discrimination per se. 18
 Following this review of social science studies,
the case law concerning sexual harassment is examined in detail to show the
inadequacies of present concepts of discrimination in addressing discrimina-
tory employment decisions that reflect and reinforce these attitudinal barriers.
The capacity of present concepts to explain other instances believed to consti-
tute discrimination is also explored. From this review it is again concluded
that an additional concept of discrimination is needed. In the final section,
this proposal is related to present concepts of discrimination and evaluated in
terms of its feasibility.
II. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
Economists have supplied fairly clear empirical evidence of significant
occupational discrimination by showing that criteria other than productivity
determine the numbers of men and women who have the opportunity to
enter particular occupations." Although they have not agreed on the causes
decisions Nos. 5-12-3275 through 5-12-3179, where it was held that "relatively skilled
Negro employees [were paid] little or no more than the base rate because of their race
rather than their skills.") (unpublished decisions on file at the Women's Rights Litiga-
tion Clinic, supra). See also EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) EmPt„ PRAC. DEC. 11 6108, 6148,
6300 for a series of decisions challenging the use of the prevailing community wage
scale as a salary setting mechanism. The F.E0C: held that such scales discriminated
against women on the basis of sex since the use of such wage scales frequently oper-
ated to favor male employees, but virtually never operated to favor female employees.
" In view of the substantial body of case law which has developed under Title
VII, and its impact on the interpretation of state legislation, this article utilizes Title
VII as the basis for exploring statutory concepts of discrimination.
" See Madden, Economic Dimensions of Occupational Segregation Comment
WOMEN ANn .11-IE WORKPLACE 245, 246 at n.2, (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan. ed. 1976).
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of this discrimination, they all point to non-economic factors to account for
the failure of women and minorities to enter successfully higher-paying oc-
cupations." On the demand side, the tastes or prejudices of employers,
co-workers, and customers operate to restrict women's employment oppor-
tunities. On the supply side, employee taste, as determined by worker expec-
tations and socialization, as well as by family and group pressures, tends to
restrain women from seeking certain jobs and from acquiring the skills neces-
sary for certain positions. There is, moreover, a circular quality to the process
since employer and employee attitudes and behaviors reinforce and per-
petuate each other. 2 '
The major neoclassical economic theories posited to date that attempt to
explain wage differentials between men and women are the "overcrowding"
hypothesis, the human capital approach, and the monopsony model, while the
institutional school has utilized a dual labor market formulation to address the
question. The demand-focused models, overcrowding and the dual labor
market formulation, are examined first, followed by a discussion of the
supply-focused models, the human capital theory, and monopsony.
Overcrowding results when there is a relatively low demand for a par-
ticular kind of worker and a large labor 'supply from which employers can
meet their demand. Under the overcrowding hypothesis," women are re-
stricted to a relatively small number of occupations because of employers'
aversion to women and minorities." As a result, there is an oversupply of
workers to meet employer demands. This oversupply of labor not only de-
presses the wage structure of jobs available to women, 24 but it has a corre-
sponding inflationary effect on the wage structure of "male" jobs.
The obvious question raised by this approach is why employers would
maintain such segregation when, as a consequence, they must pay higher
2 " See generally Blau & jusenius, Economists' Approaches to Sex Segregation in the
Labor Market: An Appraisal WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 181, (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan,
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BLAU & JUSEN1US].
21 It has been suggested, for example, that an apparent taste for overcrowded
"women's jobs" is a rational reaction on the part of women to the limited options
which face them in the present job market. Likewise, given their limited earning po-
tential as a result of employer attitudes, it is not unreasonable for women to withdraw
from the market during recessions and occupy themselves with homemaking. These
rational adaptations to employer attitudes in turn reinforce employer expectations. An
analogous "perceptual equilibrium" has been suggested in the racial context. Arrow,
Economic Dimensions of Occupational Segregation, Comment I, WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE
233, 234 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan, ed. 1976).
22 See generally Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in
Employment, 79 J. PoL. Ec. 294 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BERGMANNI; Bergmann,
Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profit When Employers Discriminate by Race or Sex, 1
EASTERN Ec. J. 103 (1974).
23 BERGMANN, supra note 22, at 294, 295.
24 Through collective bargaining, unions may have a short term effect on
wage structure. Only one out of eight working women, however, belongs to a union,
Raphael, Working Women and Their Membership in Labor Unions, 97 MONTHLY LAB REV.
27-28 (May, 1974), and only 350 out of 4,800 reported positions on the governing
boards of unions and associations are held by women. 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS, supra note 4, at 78.
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wages to men than they would under a sex-blind hiring system. In response, it
is suggested by one writer that pervasive sex role stereotypes lead employers
to believe that women would be such inefficient workers in non-traditional
jobs that they are not worth hiring, even at lower wages, and this prejudice is
sufficient to prevent even the limited hiring that would be necessary to dispel
such ill-founded beliefs."
Other economists suggest that at least some discrimination by employers
may be attributable to employee and customer preferences." If, for exam=
ple, males who perceive their manliness as enhanced by engaging in all male
activities demand higher wages for working with women, it may be more ex-
pensive for an employer to integrate the work force than to hire men only. 27
Even without an explicit demand for higher wages, employee preferences may
result in personnel frictions and attendant increased costs. 28
The dual labor market model" also highlights the importance of
employers' predispositions. This model posits two categories of occupations,
those filled externally by new workers and those filled internally by promoting
and upgrading present employees. Various possibilities for advancement are
keyed to particular entry level jobs, and placement in a given entry level job
often depends more on the employer's than the employee's choice. Outright
employer prejudice in favor of white male preserves, combined with employer
perceptions as to the average characteristics of women or minority workers,
results in the latter groups' assignment to dead-end jobs. Such "statistical dis-
crimination" or stereotyping may depend as much on myths about the par-
ticular groups as on the actual probabilities of an individual group member's
success. By definition such stereotyping disregards the possibility that an indi-
vidual member fails to share the alleged group characteristic.
Empirical data showing segregation even when men and women have
similar skills and abilities, as evidenced by their participation in the same nar-
rowly defined occupational categories, emphasizes the importance of the vari-
ous factors on the demand side identified by both the overcrowding and dual
market approach.
The human capitalist approach, utilizing a competitive model, explains
job segregation and wage differentials by factors on the supply side. 3 ° Men
" See Stevenson, Women's Wages and Job Segregation, LABOR MARKET SEGMEN-
TATION 251 (R. Edwards, M. Reich, & D. Gordon, ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
STEVENSON].
26 G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957); Arrow The Theory of
Discrimination, DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees, ed.
1973).
27 This is particularly likely to be true where equal pay is required. Where the
number of women available satisfies the employer's need for a category, an all female
force will result. See Madden, Economic Dimensions of Occupational Segregation, Comment
II, WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 245, 250 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan, ed. 1976).
28
 See STEVENSON supra note 25.
29 See BLAU & JUSENIUS, supra note 20, at 191-92; Piore, The Dual Labor Mar-
ket: Theory and Implications, PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN URBAN PERSPECTIVE
(D. Gordon, ed. 1971).
39 The human capital approach explains wage differentials in terms of differ-
ences in productivity between the sexes. As productivity is thought to be correlated
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and women differ in the human capital they accumulate through experience
in the labor force, even though they may have similar innate intelligence and
education. These differences in human capital in turn explain differences in
wages. Moreover, to the extent that women choose occupations which permit
intermittent labor force participation, occupational segregation and wage dif-
ferentials are explained. A woman's decision to participate, on an intermittent
rather than a continuous basis is attributed usually to her role in the family.
This model, however, ignores the extent to which labor market discrimina-
tion, by lowering available wages, reduces a woman's incentive to engage in
market work. 31 '
The monopsony 32 model focuses on the interplay between occupational
segregation and the supply of labor. 33 The labor supply of women is
thought to be less wage elastic due to women's relative immobility. This im-
mobility, in turn is caused by family constraints and the lack of demand for
women in alternative occupations because of occupational segregation. An
employer, faced with such inelasticity, may make a profit by paying wages that
are below the marginal value of the employee's product. Thus, an employer
has a motive to limit the employee's mobility through discrimination.
Thus, while the demand-focused models, stress employer or employer-
related prejudice, and the supply-focused models emphasize role constraints
on the female worker, it is clear that attitudinal factors play a major part in
any account of occupational discrimination from the economic perspective. It
is equally evident that the attitudinal factors involved are rooted in fixed no-
tions of class-based traits and role appropriate behavior.
Other disciplines are more helpful in exploring these notions and the
way they penetrate the employment world. Particularly useful are the findings
of sociologists and social psychologists with respect to the nature and conse-
quences of attitudinal barriers to equal employment opportunity.
The importance of attitudinal factors and their close relation to role ex-
pectations is underscored by the characteristics common to those jobs in which
women and minorities are concentrated. In addition to low pay, such jobs are
characterized by a lack of continuity and little opportunity for specialization
that would require the worker to acquire skills prior to employment rather
than on the job. 34 Women's jobs reflect an expectation that a woman's work
force participation is secondary to, and contingent upon, family considera-
tions. It is apparent that what confines women to particular jobs is their cul-
with education, age, and experience, these variables are often used as stand-ins for
productivity. Experience is emphasized since it is believed that market' skills are ac-
quired, developed, and perfected on the job. Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the
Sexes, A Review, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 14 (C. Lloyd, ed.
1975).
3] BLAU & JUSENIUS, supra note 20, at 185-86.
32 A monopsonist is defined as . an employer or group of employers who
dominate the labor market and have the power to pay less than a competitive wage.
See P. SAMUELSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS (1976).
33 See MADDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1973); BLAU &
JUSENIUS, supra note 20, at 188-189.
34 V. OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, (1970).
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tural mandate to serve primarily in the roles of wife and mother; not by any
inherent incompatability between these traditional roles and a high status po-
sition. The mechanisms by which men routinize their multiple obligations and
integrate their family and occupational activities are simply not extended
equally to women."
Attitudinal factors affect the employment opportunities available to
women in a number of ways. The phenomenon of statistical discrimination,
for example, involves the deliberate substitution of generalizations often em-
bodying stereotypes and preconceptions about groups for individualized
judgments of productivity. It is engaged in by employers who wish to
minimize both their information costs, and the risks of unceriainty. 36 In
other instances, even where the employer does make some individual inquiry,
group stereotypes may cause the employer to discount or reinterpret the ob-
jective data produced by the inquiry."
Social psychologists have documented extensively similar effects in the
perception and evaluation of individual competence. The same professional
article, for example, has been rated higher when attributed to a male, rather
than a female, author." Male artistic endeavors were judged, in the absence
of authoritative criteria, superior to those attributed to a female. Male success
is attributed to skill, while female success is seen more often as a matter of
luck." Other studies show that for a highly competent female to gain recog-
nition for her work, her accomplishments must be regarded as demonstrably
exceptional. Not only must a woman be seen as succeeding in a realm outside
traditional women's roles within a context requiring unusual drive and dedica-
tion, but her worth must be supported by the positive evaluation of an au-
thoritative source. 4 ° These findings would seem to account for the
35 For a forceful presentation of this argument see Coser & Rokoff, Women in
the Occupational World: Social Disruption and Conflict, 18 Soc. PROB. 535 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COSER & RoKoFr]. The authors point out, for example, that support. sys-
tems are organized around high status professionals whose work is expected to be
disrupted simply because they are so important that emergency demands will be made
on them. Disruptions suffered by women, on the other hand, are seen as being due to
a failure to meet occupational role expectations and are therefore not considered
legitimate. Thus an academic institution is likely to tolerate the rescheduling of classes
and meetings required when a professor travels for private consulting, but it is un-
likely to tolerate a lesser number of absences associated with child care. The authors
also point out that since women's occupational status is never quite legitimate, they,
unlike men, don't have the leeway to take occasional time off without its being seen as
final proof of lack of commitment to work.
" See discussion in text accompanying note 30. See also Wage Discrimination,
supra note 14, at manuscript pp. 150-156.
37 Id.
" Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against Women, 5 TRANSACTION 28 (1968):
Bern & Bern, Case Study of a Non-conscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her
Place, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (DJ. Bern, ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as BEM & BEM].
39 Deaux & Emswiller, Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked
Tasks, 29 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 80 (1974).
4 ° O'Leary, Some Attitudinal Barriers to Occupational Aspirations in Women, 81
PSYCH. BULL. 809, 812 (1974) citing findings of Taynor & Deuz, When Women are More
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phenomenon reported by sociologists of competent women simply "not being
heard." 4 1
Studies focusing specifically on employment decisions also show the im-
pact of sex-based biases on perception. In simulated hiring situations, male
applicants for managerial positions are rated higher and accepted more fre-
quently than equally qualified females, particularly for more demanding posi-
tions." On the other hand, when performance in low-level, unskilled tasks
such as stocking store shelves is scored, there is a tendency to inflate female
performance. 43 Some research suggests that it is the interaction between the
applicant's sex and the sex-orientation of the position that influences hiring
decisions."
Similar biases have been observed in simulations of post-hiring decisions.
An equally qualified woman is less likely to be promoted, to be offered train-
ing opportunities, and to have her personnel assessments accepted than her
male counterpart." Stereotypic role expectations are particularly evident in
findings that married women are less likely to be promoted to positions in-
volving travel than comparably situated males. Similarly, where equally qual-
ified male and female applicants indicate that their families come first, the
woman is less likely to be promoted." Consistent with such employer at-
titude toward male and female family responsibilities, men are less likely to be
granted leaves for child care." Similarly, less effort is deemed appropriate
to attempt to retain a female employee who has been offered a job
elsewhere."
Where the information available to the decision-maker is limited or the
decision-making criteria are ambiguous, it is easy to envision a decision-maker
Deserving than Men; Equity, Attribution and Perceived Sex Differences, 28 J. PERS. & Soc.
PSYCH. 360-67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as O'LEARY].
11 Epstein, What Keeps Women Out of the Executive Suite, BRINGING WOMEN INTO
MANAGEMENT (F. Gordon & M. Strober, eel. 1975).
42
 Rosen & Jerdee, Effects of Applicant's Sex and Difficulty of Job Evaluation of
Candidates Jiff Managerial Positions, 59 J. APP. PSYCH. 511 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
ROSEN & JERDEE] .
4 " Hamner, Kim, Baird
	 Bigoness, Race and Sex as Determinants of Ratings by
Potential Employers in a Simulated Work-Sampling Task, 59 J. APP. PSYCH. 705 (1974).
Interestingly, the low-skilled position for which Hamner et al. found inflated female
ratings is male-dominated [hereinafter cited as HAMNER ET
" Cohen & Bunker, Subtle Effects of Sex Role Stereotypes on Recruiters' Hiring
Decisions, 60 J. APP. PsycH. 566 (1975) (hiring for male-oriented position of personnel
technician and female-oriented position of editorial assistant).
45 Rosen & Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 J.
APP. PSYCH. 9 (1974) (bank managers as subjects) [hereinafter cited as Influence of Sex
Role Stereotypes].
411 Rosen, Jerdee & Prestwich, Dual-Career Marital Adjustment: Potential Effects of
Discriminatory tYlanagerial Attitudes. 37 J. MARK. & Fiuvi. 565 (1975) (national sample of
managers and executives). The failure to promote women but not men who indicate
that their families come first would seem to correlate with higher male earnings even
where job characteristics are held constant.
" Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes, supra note 45, at 12-13.
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falling back on preconceived notions. 49 Indeed, although they appear in-
creasingly unwilling to intervene in such cases, 9° the courts have recognized
the ready opportunity for discrimination that subjective evaluations afford."
The problem of biased evaluations in more "objective" situations, however, is
not as well known. Nevertheless, there is evidence that bias also affects per-
ceptions of performance on an objectively quantifiable task. Thus a laboratory
study found that while whites were generally rated accurately by white raters,
blacks with identical actual perfomance levels received significantly lower rat-
ings from white raters. 52
Despite the fairly persuasive evidence that bias occurs in both subjective
and objective evaluations, several factors make it quite difficult to identify in
actual operation. Bias is, first of all, frequently unconscious. Second, since the
focus is on the individual rather than group performance or capability, often
the easier explanation is that the individual is at fault." Third, bias is
further disguised by the expression of judgment in terms that appear both
neutral and relevant.'" Indeed, the interplay of these factors is no doubt
sufficient to mask differential treatment prompted by stereotypical biases. For
example, although research findings have shown that appearance and educa-
tion are weighted more heavily for female than male applicants, such bias
probably would not be recognized in an individual case."
1 " Interestingly, research findings show that sex stereotypes have a greater
relative impact in such cases than other "negative - data. See Shaw, Differential Impact (f
Negative Stereotyping in Employee Selection, 25 PERS. PSYCH. 33 (1972).
5 " Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976); Badillo v. Dallas
County Community Action Committee, 394 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Fogg v.
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., :346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N,H. 1972). See gener-
ally Vladeck & Young, Sex Discrimination in Higher Education: It's Not Academic,
WoNtEx's Rm. L. REP. 59 (1978): Ginensky & Rogoff, Subjective Employment Criteria and
the Future qf Title VII in Professional jobs, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 165 (1976).
5 ' See,. e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Co•p., 457 F.2d 348, 358-59 (5th Cir.
1972); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1190-94 (5th Cir. 1976); Pace Col-
lege v. New York City Human Rights Commission, 11 KM PL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)
EmPL. PRAC. I)Ec. 10,685 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).
52 HAMNER rE AL., supra note 43. M. 709. It should be noted that blacks re-
ceived higher rating front evaluators of their own race. This finding may assume im-
portance should racial minorities become supervisors in significant munhers.
53 This is not to say that it would be impossible lo prove bias once it is sus-
pected. For example. where qualifications are judged by discrete work prodUcts which
can be shown sex-blind or color-blind to outside judges, it may be possible to prove a
different standard has been applied to the female or minority applicant. However,
where a personnel decision is biased on overall impressions or other data uniquely
identifying the applicant, or where !here have been no comparable judgments concern-
ing male or majority applicants which can be used to establish a standard of compari-
son, the proof is much more difficult.
51 The Goldberg study cited in note 38, supra, for example. involved ratings
on the value, persuasiveness, writing style, and competence of professional articles.
55 See Cecil, Paul & Lins, Perceived Importance qf Selected Variables Used to
Evaluate Male and Female Job Applicants, 26 PERS. PSYCH. 397 (1973) wherein the au-
thors found that personality, appearance and skills-education were weighted more
heavily in evaluating female applicants while motivation-ability and interpersonal rela-
tions were more important in evaluating male applicants for the same job.
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Other studies, showing overt attitudinal biases, suggest that distortions in
perception and evaluation are linked closely with role expectations. One study
found that male managers, when asked directly, indicated that women were
no less capable than men. They did express, however, a strong commitment
to societal norms that call for deference in male-female interaction and to the
belief that both males and females prefer male supervisors. They also per-
ceived women, because of their biological and personal characteristics, as lack-
ing dependability. 56
At times, the connection between group membership and expectations
for that group is made explicit in a performance context, as when work is
evaluated as "pod ... for a woman." But stereotypical expectations are also
manifested in the perception of certain jobs. The managerial model, for
example, is articulated explicitly in terms of sex-linked virtues. In the words
of one writer:
The model of the successful manager in our culture is a masculine
one. The good manager is aggressive, competitive, firm and just. He
is not feminine, he is not soft and yielding or dependent or intuitive
in the womanly sense. The very expression of emotion is widely
viewed as a feminine weakness that would interfere with effective
business processes. 57
Quite simply, managerial work is strictly perceived as man's work.
The discrepancy between perceived job requirements and assumed
worker attributes impacts both on employer decision-making and on employee
performance. This problem is well illustrated by the predicament of women
seeking to participate on equal terms in the nation's economic life. Apart from
very real competing demands of time and energy facing women attempting to
meet both work and home obligations, both men and women have been im-
bued with the notion that there is an inherent conflict between femininity and
competence. Female socialization, stressing marriage and family as sources of
fulfillment, encourages such female attributes as personal warmth and em-
pathy, sensitivity and emotionalism, grace, charm, compliance, dependence,
and deference." Male attributes such as aggressiveness, egotism, persistence,
and ambitious drive are discouraged." On the other hand, it generally is
believed that success in the work world requires such distinctly unfeminine
qualities as drive, personal dedication, aggressiveness, emotional detachment,
and "a kind of sexless matter-of-factness equated with intellectual perform-
59 See Bass, Krusell & Alexander, Male Managers' Altitudes Toward Working
Women, 15 AMER. BEM. SCE. 221 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BASS ET AL.]. A similar
discomfort with the notion of a female boss also appears in other studies. See Bowman,
Wortney & Greyser, Are Women Executives People?, 43 F1ARv. Bus. REV. 14-28, 164-78
(1965); B. GILMER, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1961); R, LORING, & T. WELLS. BREAK-
THROUGH: WOMEN INTO IVIANAGEMENT (1972); E. LYNCH, THE EXECUTIVE: SUITE-
FEMININE STYLE (1973).
57 D. MCGREGOR, THE PROFESSIONAL MANAGER 23 (1967).
99 CF. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE 20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EP.s .mis].
99 Id. at 22.
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ante.""" Working women judged by male supervisors imbued with these con-
flicting standards are said to be subjected to a "double-whammy" or double
bind:
If she is competent, and successful at the task (which in the work
situation is defined as the appropriate and top-priority concern), she
will be judged deficient as a female. Conversely, if she satisfies these
self-appointed judges as to her femininity, she will not be doing the
job."
From the employer's perspective then, any heightened awareness of the work-
er's sexual identification is likely to interfere with a favorable evaluation of
her work. Moreover, conduct that makes this group identification salient is
also likely to interfere with an employee's actual performance by arousing any
doubts she may have about her competence and appropriate role, and feeding
general feelings of inferiority resulting from her socialization. 62
Against this backdrop, specific stereotypically-based behavior patterns can
be seen to hinder women's task performance. In the words of one
psychologist:
The potential conflict between competence and femininity can be
aroused—with negative effects on performance—in any situation
where women work under the surveillance of men. The appropriate
behavior for men in the work situation is to respond to and take
seriously the task performance of the women workers. It is inap-
propriate to invoke other roles—particularly aspects of the sex role,
e.g., by being too personal, by flirting, by forms of address which
involve diminutives, too much familiarity, and so forth ....
For the same reason, constant references—no matter how
benevolent—to the personal appearance, social life and potential
marriage and family plans of women have the same effect. They
" Id. at 23.
8r
 Laws, The Bell Telephone System: A Case Study, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 157, 164 (P. Wallace, ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
LAws]: Prather, Why Can't Wonien Be More Like Men, A Summary of the Sociopsychological
Factors Hindering Warne-W.5 Advancement in the Professions, 15 AMER. BEH. SCI. 172 (1971).
6  See LAWS. supra note 61; \Volition & Frank, The Solo Woman in a Professional
Peer Group, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 164 (1975): Komarovsky, Cultural Contradictions
and Sex Roles, 52 AMER. J. Soc. 184 (1946); Faunce, Psychological Barriers to Occupational
Success for Women, 40 J. NAWDAC 140 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FAUNCE]. Faunce
provides a useful illustration of this process in discussing the detrimental impact of the
stereotype of women as housewives:
This myth is an ideal view, unrelated to fact. It serves the purpose of form-
ing images, so that even the women who are working are convinced that
they are not really "workers" and do not think in terms of their ambitions,
goals, demands, and rights. They may tell themselves that they are only
working temporarily and therefore not to take their occupational identity
seriously. If they fail to take themselves seriously, who else will do so?
Id. at 142. See also Condry	 Dyer, Fear of Success: Attribution of Cause to the Victim, 32 J.
Soc. lssuEs 63 (1976).
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convey the message that a woman's work and a woman as a worker,
are not being taken seriously."
Since role conflict for women appears to be strongly influenced by their per-
ception of what men expect to see in women," the effects of the femininity/
competence conflict are likely to be significant.
While stereotypically-based behavior permeates the work world," a par-
ticularly unfortunate dynamic has been noted in contexts where previously
excluded groups begin to break through. As the literature suggests," the hir-
ing of tokens does not function effectively to break down attitudinal barriers
to equal employment opportunity. Indeed, recent studies indicate that so long
as the number of "outsiders" introduced is insignificant, attitudinal barriers
will be reinforced."
Several explanations may be offered for the failure of tokens to break
down stereotypes. First, tokens become highly visible, yet they are viewed as
stereotypes rather than individuals." The presence of tokens disturbs the
dominant group's commonality and leads its members to reaffirm the group's
solidarity by underlining the majority culture and the tokens' differences from
it." Such behavior involves making the introduction of a token the occasion
for dramatizing the themes which make tokens outsiders. Thus, whether in
the industrial management setting" or in the construction trades," male be-
"3 Laws, supra note 61, at 165-166. See also Fox, "Nice-Girl": Social Control of
Women through a Value Construct, 2 SIGNS 805 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. Since
control of women in our system is through internalized norms, one must recognize
actions which evoke those internalized norms as part of the confinement.
14 Gordon & Hall, Self-image and Stereotypes of Femininity: Their Relation to
Women's Role Conflicts and Coping, 59 J. APP. Psvcri. 241 (1974). This is consistent with
the general phenomenon that the values and perceptions of the dominant. group are
internalized by minority groups. See, e.g., Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30 So-
C1AL FORCES 60 (1951).
"' See text accompanying notes 34-64.
66 BASS, ET AL., supra note 56, A.M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPO-
RATION (1977); [hereinafter cited as KANTER], Laws, The Psychology of Tokenism: An
Analysis, 1 Sex ROLES 51 (1975); See also Wolman & Frank, The Solo Woman in a Profes-
sional Peer Group, 45 AMER. J. ORTItoPsycntAT. 164 (1975); Frank & Katcher, Percep-
tions of Freshwomen Dental and Medical Students lyy their Freshman Peers, (unpublished
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Ass'n..
Washington, D.C. 1975); Spangler, Gordon & Pipkin, Token Women: An Empirical Test
of Kanter's Hypothesis, 84 AM. J. Soc. 160 (1978).
"7 KANTER, supra MAC 66.
" The sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter attributes this to three perceptual
tendencies—visibility, contrast, and assimilation which are associated with the propor-
tional rarity of tokens. See KANTER„ supra note 66, at 210-12. See also Epstein, Institu-
tional Barriers: What Keeps Women out of the Executive Suite, BRINGING WOMEN INTO
MANAGEMENT 7 (F. Gordon & 141. Strober, ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Institutional
Barriers]; LAWS, supra note 61.
' See PLANTER, supra note 66, at 221-30. See also G. Allport, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE; 41-42 (1954) [hereinafter cited as ALepoRT]: E. Coffman. STIGMA 5-19,
112-14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as GOFFMAN].
7" KANTER, supra note 66, at 222-24.
71 See Affidavits in Support of Plaintiff's :Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Opposition to Defendants' MotiOn for Summary Judgment at. Exhibits A-L,
Advocates for Women v. F. Ray Marshall, No. 76-0862 (U.S.D.C., filed February 14,




havior around token women is likely to involve exaggerated displays of ag-
gression and sexual teasing, and showing off through prowess-oriented war
stories." Second, the presence of tokens may provoke questions or apologies
about the majority's culture—as in apologizing for swearing in front of
women—which pressure the tokens to acquiesce in the dominants' culture,
while at the same time making it clear that the group does not expect their
behavior to come naturally to the tokens. Third, tokens are pressured to show
loyalty to the majority by accepting the position of "exception," or of comic
inferior, and foregoing criticism of their treatment. If tokens give in to such
pressures, they stand to incur the psychic costs of turning against one's
kind. 73 If they resist, they are unlikely to be included in informal interac-
tions important for learning the job 74 or for establishing "political" con :
tacts. 75 In either case, an adverse effect on work performance is likely.
Stereotypical assumptions about what tokens must be like serve to encap-
sule tokens in limited and caricatured roles that allow tokens to be absorbed
into the dominant group's culture without altering it." An important
mechanism in this process of role encapsulation appears to be the constant
reminder of behavior that is considered appropriate for a member of the
token's group."
Likewise, internalized role expectations affect the positions sought by
workers and their ability to perform once on the job, thereby precluding indi-
vidualized judgments regarding the suitability of applicants." It would ap-
72 See KANTER, supra note 66, at 222-24.
73 KANTER, supra note 66, at 230: ALLPORT, supra note 69, at 145-48, 150-53.
74 KANTER, supra note 66, at 230; see also Affidavits, supra note 71.
RANTER, supra note 66, at 230. EPSTEIN, .supra note 58, Albrecht, Inprmal
Interaction Patterns of Professional W (Wien, WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT (M. Gerrard, J.
Oliver & M. Williams. ed. 1976).
7 " For example, Kanter has observed four stereotypical roles for women in
the management context. Women who respond to their image as sympathetic listeners
may become "mothers" to their groups, expected to listen to and provide comfort for
personal problems. Seen as a source of emotional nurturance and support, such
women are unlikely to be rewarded for critical, independent, task-oriented behaviors.
Other women who are perceived primarily in terms of their sexuality arc reduced to
the role of seductress or sex object. Encapsulation of such a role both complicates a
woman's relations with male co-workers and supervisors, who may assume the rule of
"protector," and serves to provide a ready explanation of any work-related success.
Women in the less overtly sexual role of per or mascot may be considered precious or
precocious, and their competency likewise undervalued. Finally, women who resist
overtures tending to trap them into the first three roles may he cased as overly tough
"iron maidens." As such, they may be isolated and left to flounder on their own. See
KANTER, supra note 66, at 233-38. Focusing on interactions between roles, Bradford,
Sargent and Sprague have identified four similar male-female role relationships which
likewise reenforce stereotypes arid interfere with female employees being viewed as
competent at traditionally male tasks. Bradford, Sargent & Sprague, The Executive Man
and Woman: The Issue of Sexuality, BRINGING WOMEN INTO MANACEMENT 46-52 (F. Gor-
don & M. Strober, ed. 1975).
77 Goffman cites the example of the well-read professional criminal whose
tastes constantly evoked expressions of surprise from others who saw him primarily as
a criminal. While in the form of compliments, such expressions served to isolate and
confirm the man in his stigmatized status. GOFTMANN, supra note 69, at 14-15.
FAUNCE, supra note 62; O'LEARY, supra note 40.
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pear, moreover, that in both employers and employees, existing preconcep-
tions are exacerbated by actions on the job that invoke and reinforce
stereotypic role expectations. Given these results and the impossibility of con-
structing a socialization process that does not reflect at least in some way the
realities of the work world," it may be that an effective attack on attitudinal
barriers in the work context. will require the introduction of significant num-
bers of women and minorities. 8 °
Corrective measures short of numerical remedies, however, may work.
Common sense would indicate that if we are aware that our evaluations of
particular behavior depend on our expectations of what is appropriate for
that person's race or sex, it is possible for us to correct for such differential
evaluations. Not surprisingly, a number of writers have suggested that making
managers and other evaluators aware of their own race and gender biases can
be an effective method of reducing those biases. 8 '
The material reviewed here suggests a possible approach' to reducing the
detrimental impact of class-based attitudinal factors. A system that imposes
liability on employers for personnel actions that are the product of stereotypic
role expectations could provide both a mechanism and an incentive for iden-
tifying attitudinal biases. In this way, both the practical weight of the law and
its moral force are directed at eliminating the barriers to equal employment
opportunity that result from stereotypic role expectations. While such legal
intervention may or may not effect changes in underlying attitudes," it could
go a long way toward preventing biased .attitudes from resulting in adverse
employment decisions. As such, it is a healthy first step in their elimination.
Employers attempting to minimize their exposure to liability for adverse per-
7" Clearly such notions and expectations do not first arise in the work envi-
ronment, but rather are formed and absorbed as a result of early socialization. See BEM
& 111,1m, supra note 38. They nonetheless intrude significantly on the work environ-
ment., and to the extent that their impact can be diminished the goals of equal
employment opportunity will he furthered. But see KANTKR supra note 66. emphasizing
the overriding impact of one's location in the work structure on productivity, self-
esteem, and competence.
8" An analogous notion of critical mass has already been recognized in the
education context. The mass is said to serve the function of counteracting the effects
of tokenism described in note 68, supra. See Spangler. Gordon & Pipkin. Token Women:
An Empirical Test of Kanter's Hypothesis, 84 AN1. J. Soc. 160 (1978).
"I See BASS FIT AL. supra note 56 at 235: HAMNER ET AL., supra note 43 at 710
citing Schmidt & Johnson, The Effect of Race on Peer Ratings in an Industrial Situation, 57
J. APP. PSYCH. 237, 241 (1973); Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes, supra note 45, at 14;
McKenna & Denmark, Women and the University, 5 INVI. j. GRP. TENSIONS 226, 233
(1975).
" Allport and others have argued that civil rights legislation will ultimately
change prejudicial attitudes initially by creating a public conscience and a standard for
expected behavior that checks oven signs of prejudice and by providing a means of
breaking vicious circles. Attitudes then change because individuals experience discom-
fort when there is a dissonance between their views and the official morality. See
ALLPORT, supra note 69, at 469-73. There is some evidence that where individuals feel
that they are being forced to comply by external threats. negative attitudes will harden.
See Bens, Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretrition of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena,
47 PSYCH. REv. 182 (1967).
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sonnel actions flowing from stereotypic role expectations may experiment with
remedial measures addressed to such biases, and the prospect of liability if
such experiments fail should provide an incentive for employers to resolve the
basic question of whether educational programs will suffice to deter such ac-
tions or whether ultimately numerical remedies will be required . " '
III. THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION
A. A Detailed Study: Sexual Harassment"
Sexual references, as well as explicit demands for sexual cooperation,
convey the message that a woman is a sexual object before she is a contribut-
ing worker, and whether it is consciously undertaken or not, such behavior
serves to reinforce woman's sexual role. Indeed, such behavior is probably the
quintessential expression of stereotypic role expectations. Like other expres-
sions of stereotypic expectations occurring at the work place, it is dysfunc-
tional in two respects. Whether or not perceived as flattering by women,"`'
sexual advances remind women of a societally-imposed incongruity between
their role as worker and as woman. By thus arousing role conflict in women,
advances interfere with their performance. By underscoring their sexual iden-
tity in the eyes of male supervisors, sexual advances make it less likely that.
women will be viewed as persons capable of performing a demanding task,
and consequently, less likely that they will have the opportunity to try to do
SD.
But despite the obstacles it poses to equal employment opportunity, it is
difficult to fit sexual harassment into traditional concepts of discrimination,
requiring either a showing of hostile motive, differential treatment, or dis-
parate impact. Because those making sexual demands and allusions are often
merely acting out the roles they have been taught by society, unaware of the
hostile nature of their conduct, the notion of old-time evil motive, equivalent
to racial animus, seems inappropriate. Furthermore, it is often impossible to
show unequal treatment. by showing a male was not harassed, particularly be-
cause the overwhelming majority of women work in sex-segregated jobs where
there are no similarly-situated males. Finally, harassment. which is composed
" See notes 80 & 81 supra.
" I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Working Women's Institute
in preparation of this section.
" Little hard data is available regarding sexual harassment altogether. How-
ever some recent —albeit self-selecting—studies suggest that most ‘vonien do not enjoy
sexual advances on the job. The great majority scent to find the unsolicited sexual
attention of male co-workers and supervisors to be "embarrassing. - -demeaning" or
"intimidating. - Only 15% of 9,000 women polled described such advances as "flatter-
ing. - See Safran, What Men do to Women on the Job. 148 Rt.:1)1mm; 149. 217 (1970).
Likewise in an unpublished survey developed by the Women's Section of the Human
Affairs Program at Cornell University. only 3% of the 155 respondents reported that
they were flattered by the•unwanted sexual advances of supervisors and co-employees.
More than 50% of the women said they were angered or upset by these incidents. See
generally L. FA RLEV. SEXUAL SDAKEDoWN (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sex um,
SHAKEDOWN].
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of the acts of individuals, rarely can be said to be a neutral company policy
with a disparate impact—although tolerance of those acts may well be such a
policy, since in our society it is by and large males who exercise the right to
sexual initiative, and mostly females who are subjected to that initiative.
Given these difficulties in fitting sexual harassment into the present con-
ceptual scheme of discrimination, courts seem to emphasize the notion of un-
equal treatment. Some courts specifically point to male co-workers whose jobs
were not subjected to sexual conditions. Others point to the sexual orientation
of the aggressor. But throughout the cases there is a preoccupation with the
hypothetical female boss who will make parallel demands of her male subor-
dinate.
This section reviews current case law and argues that so long as courts
analyze sexual harassment in terms of present concepts of discrimination and
do not see it as behavior that serves to keep women in their historical role as
persons who can alter their circumstances only by trading on their sexuality,
the courts will lack an adequate basis for resolving two important questions—
the scope of conduct to be proscribed and the extent of employer liability. In
particular, when courts lack an understanding of the discriminatory impact of
sexual harassment on the work environment, there is a tendency to restrict
unduly the type of conduct they regard as prohibited and to impose narrow
limits on employer liability. If, on the other hand, courts ultimately recognize
the way sexual demands and allusions function to keep Women in their place,
they may well expect employers to remedy or even prevent such conduct,
whether it comes from supervisors or co-workers.
I. Commentary on Current Case Law
Following a series of first-round defeats," women alleging sexual
harassment by their superiors appear to have established a cause of action for
" The early case law of sexual harrassment is thoroughly discussed and
critiqued in C. MAC KINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 57-99 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MAcKiNNont].
See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Calif. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. PSE&G Co., 422 F. Stipp. 553 (D.
N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded,  568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP
CAS. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), reu'd and remanded sub nom Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977): Conte v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated
and remanded without reported decision, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). In failing to find
Title VII violations presented by such circumstances, the reasoning of the district
courts varied. In Come v. Bausch and Lomb; the court focused primarily on the "per-
sonal" nature of the supervisor's behavior, stressing that the employer had nothing to
gain from the supervisor's conduct. 390 F. Supp. at 163. The lower court in Miller
likewise focused on the personal nature of the conduct, having found as a fact that the
employer's policy prohibited such conduct. 418 F. Supp. at 235. By this focus, the two
courts sidestepped the really pertinent question of whether a term of sexual com-
pliance had in fact been imposed on the plaintiff's employment. In contrast, the dis-
trict court opinions in Barnes and Tomkins recognized a condition had been imposed,
but denied that the condition was imposed "because of sex." Thus the lower court
decision in Barnes reasoned that the plaintiff "was discriminated not because she was a
woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor," 13
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such claims under Title VII. Two courts of appeals have addressed the issue
at length, recognizing that sexual demands linked to adverse employment
consequences constitute violations of Title VII. No circuit has yet adopted a
contrary view, and all lower court decisions holding otherwise have been re-
versed. 87
The common factual thread presented by these cases is a demand for
sexual relations by a male supervisor of a female subordinate who is then
faced with the choice of compliance or adverse job consequences. The cases
vary as to whether the supervisor explicitly couples the demand with the
threat of adverse action or whether that link becomes explicit only upon later
retaliatory action. It generally is not clear whether there are other
subordinates—either male or female.
To establish a cause of action under Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII it is
sufficient for a plaintiff to show that (1) a term or condition of employment
had been imposed (2) because of sex or other prohibited class (3) by the
employer." Therefore, in holding that the allegations of sexual harassment
before them made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the
D.C. Circuit in Barnes v. Castle," and the Third Circuit in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Company," necessarily found all three elements satisfied.
Since clear-cut consequences for career development were alleged in both
cases, however, neither court was called upon to define the contours of the
FEP Cas. at 124. Similarly, the lower court finding in Tomkins that "sexual harassment
and sexually motivated assault do not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII,"
was based on the view that "[although] sexual desire animated the parties, or at least
one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim of abuse." 422 F. Supp. at
556.
An additional undercurrent running through the cases is a concern that permit-
ting sexual harassment claims to be heard under Title VII would flood the federal
courts with unwarranted claims. This concern was rejected by the Third Circuit in
Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1049.
87 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. PSE&G Co.,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); See also Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979); Fisher v. Flynn, 19 FEP Cas. 932 (1st Cir. 1979); Garber v. Saxon Business
Prod. Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C.
1976).
88 Section 703(a)(2) provides an alternative route to liability for sexual
harassment, making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employMent
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
This provision is not discussed explicitly (1) because it has not been relied on in
the sexual harassment cases decided to date; and (2) because as already noted, its
requirement that the adverse action be "because of ... sex ..." would seem to build in
the three concepts of discrimination now employed. Presumably the provision has not
been relied on in harassment litigation because the term "to limit" has been assumed to
have a meaning akin to "segregate" and "classify."
" 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
9° 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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phrase, "terms and conditions of employment," in the sexual harassment con-
text. Similarly, neither opinion appears to have provided a definitive resolu-
tion of the question of vicarious liability—that is, when, in the harassment
context, the employer may be deemed to have imposed the term or condition of
employment. While their results seem eminently correct as far as they go,
neither Barnes nor Tomkins reaches many instances of on-the-job harassment,
as, for example, when the woman is subjected to obscene remarks, repeated
inquiries into her sex life, subtle propositions, body brushes, or grabs." Nor
is it clear that either opinion reflects a sufficient understanding of the way
sexual harassment interferes with equal employment opportunity to provide
adequate guidance for dealing with the full range of factual permutations
encountered by women workers. Both circuit opinions explicitly found dis-
crimination "because of sex." Neither court, however, is entirely clear about
the way in which its finding relates to concepts of discrimination utilized by
the courts to date; that is, whether the conduct is discriminatory because it
reflects class-based animus, unequal treatment or a neutral policy having a
disparate impact.
In Tomkins the Third Circuit based its finding on the plaintiff's allegation
that her gender was the "motivating factor" underlying her supervisor's de-
mands." In Barnes, the D.C. Circuit rooted its finding in the facts: the
vitiating sex factor ... stemmed not from the fact that what appellant's
superior demanded was sexual activity—which of itself is immaterial—but
from the fact that he imposed upon her tenure in her then position a condi-
tion which he ostensibly would not have fastened upon a male employee.""
Both courts understood that discrimination because of sex could occur where
predicated in part, but not entirely on sex or where directed against some,
though not all, women. Drawing on the legislative history of Title VII (which
shows Congress explicitly rejected language prohibiting discrimination only
where solely on the basis of sex) and the "sex-plus" cases (which indicate dis-
crimination against a subset of the class of women is prohibited), the Barnes
court stated that "it is enough that gender is a factor contributing to the dis-
crimination in a substantial way."" Likewise, in Tornkins the Third Circuit
averred that "it is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in
the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff `had been a man she would not
have been treated in the same manner.' "95
 For both courts it was necessary
only to show that but for the plaintiff's gender the solicitation would not have
occurred.
The courts, however, were less clear as to how that but-for factor is to be
proved. The Tomkins decision gives plaintiffs no clue whatsoever as to how to
proceed. It simply leaves that question to the plaintiff at trial." Barnes simi-
91 See generally SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, supra note 85, and MACKINNON, supra
note 86, at 25-55.
92
 Tomkins v. PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d-.1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1977).
93
 Barites v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
94 Id. at 990.
95
 Tomkins v. PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) citing Skel-
ton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976),
9" Id. at 1047. See also MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 72.
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larly leaves the question for trial."' Although the opinion has more to say on
the subject, it is still highly ambiguous. On the one hand, the Barnes court
relied on unequal treatment cases, which would suggest that in order to estab-
lish sex-predicated discrimination the plaintiff must show that at least one
woman, and no men, has been subjected to the treatment at issue. " 8 On the
other hand, the court seemed to indicate that plaintiff's allegations—which
did not explicitly contain such a claini—were sufficient to make out a prima
fade case of' discrimination. It was enough that the plaintiff "flatly claimed
that but for her gender she would not have been importuned, and nothing to
the contrary has as yet appeared, and there [was] no suggestion that appel-
lant's allegedly amorous supervisor [was] other than heterosexual.' Thus
"appellant's gender, just as much as her cooperation, was an indispensible
factor in the job-retention condition of which she complains, absent a showing
that the supervisor imposed a similar condition upon a male co-
employee."'" Presumably, the defendant could have rebutted this prima facie
case by showing that the supervisor was a bisexual who had made similar
advances to male subordinates. Whether a showing of bisexual tendencies on
the part of the supervisor is adequate is left unresolved.'"
The result of putting such questions of proof off to another day is to
leave the lower courts with little guidance, 1 °2 and to mask the real theory of
discrimination that underlies these cases. The discrimination at issue in Barnes
and Tomkins does not seem to depend directly on the presence or absence of
similarly situated workers of the opposite sex.' °3 Rather, one suspects that
47 561 F.2d at 989 n,49,
98 Id. at 991-92. This conclusion is drawn from the court's reading of General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125 (1976) and Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 544
(1971) and is bolstered by its reference to Slack v. Havens, 7 FEP Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975), a case in which black women were required
to perform heavy cleaning, an assignment not required of the one white woman. The
Barnes court also states somewhat ambiguously that "the circumstance imparting high
visibility to the role of gender in the affair is that no male employee was susceptible to
such an approach by appellant's supervisor." 561 F.2d at 990.
99 Id. at 989 n.49.
'"') Id. at 992.
1 " See id. at 989-90 n.49.
102 Although one trial court has stated that to present a prima fade case of
sexual harassment, a plaintiff must plead and prove inter alia that employees of the
opposite sex were not affected in the same way by the supervisor's actions, see Heelen
v. Johns-Manville, 451 F. Stipp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1975) and Bundy v. Jackson, 19
EMPLOYMENT PHAC. GUIDE (CCH) EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11 954 (D.D.C. 1979) other courts
appear to assume such allegations and proofs are not necessary. See, e.g., Stringer v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Munford v. James
T. Barnes and Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
103 The simple "but-for" formulation is reminiscent of Justice Marshall's ren-
dering of the McDonnell-Douglas approach to pretext in the context of differential
treatment. of an individual member of a normally favored class:
"pretext ... does not mean ... that the Title VII plaintiff must show that
he would have in any event been rejected or discharged solely on the basis
of his race, without regard to the alleged pretextual deficiencies ... no
more is required to be shown than that race was a 'but-for' cause".
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the Barnes court, at least, was concerned with the supervisor's mind set. This
concern, however, is never fully articulated. It emerges instead in a discussion
of employer liability for single instances of discrimination, once a finding of
sex discrimination has been made. In this final section of its opinion, nomi-
nally addressed to the lower court's characterization of the case as "a con-
troversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relation-
ship," the court analogizes the dispute to two cases where individual women
were fired due to their relationship with a man of another race.'" While the
cases are cited for the proposition that discrimination may occur whether or
not others of the same sex or race are subject to like treatment, they are in
fact cases closely akin to instances where class-based hostility is displayed so
that there is no need to identify similarly situated members of more favored
classes who receive preferential treatment.'"
Yet despite that hint of interest in analogies to instances of class-based
animus, and despite the ambiguities surrounding the need for proof of simi-
larly situated co-workers of the opposite sex, neither court fully explored the
mechanism motivating the supervisor's adverse treatment of his female subor-
dinate. This failure is perhaps inevitable once the court got caught up in the
female supervisor, homosexual supervisor, and bisexual supervisor hypotheti-
cals posed by the defendant and lower courts.'" Both appellate courts accu-
rately labelled such hypotheticals irrelevant to the cases at hand, and dealt
with them through the "but-for" formulation already noted. Thus the
hypothetical female supervisor who imposes sexual cooperation on her male
subordinates would discriminate because of sex. The hypothetical homosexual
supervisor who subjects his male subordinates, while leaving female subordi-
nates alone, also would discriminate because of sex. It is only the hypothetical
bisexual boss who makes sexual demands on subordinates of both sexes who
would not discriminate on the basis of sex. The results of this approach, as
well as the symmetry of the treatment, are appealing. 107
 Indeed, it might
seem somehow discriminatory not to apply the same analytic framework to
both the real and the hypothetical cases.
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co,, 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976), There, how-
ever, it was clear that there was a similarly situated black co-worker who had been
accused of stealing company property, but who unlike the plaintiffs, two white men.
had not been discharged. Id. at 276.
104 See Barnes v. Castle, 5 .61 F.2d 983, 993-94 (D.C. C,ir. 1977) discussing Vuy-
anich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Tex. 1976) and Whit-
ney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.O.N.Y. 1975).
1 " As the Barnes court observed, although the charged filed with EEOC in the
Vuyanich case was limited to race discrimination, the court noted the assumption that a
black women married to a white man did not need her job was sexist as well as racist.
See 561 F.2d at 993-994 n.78, and discussion in text surrounding notes 206-17 infra.
10" See Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977): Toinkins v.
PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d 1044. 1047 (3d Cir. 1977): Williams v. Saxbe. 413 F. Stipp, 654.
657 (D.D.C. 1976).
107 But see Note, Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WAsn.
L. REV. 123, 127-28 (1977).
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Nevertheless, the consequence of this symmetrical analysis is to ignore
the asymmetrical social reality of the sexual harassment phenomenon, and
thereby to underestimate its dimensions and its seriousness. To require an
employee to engage in sexual acts in order to remain or progress in a job now
seems sufficiently shocking to merit recognition as a violation of our fair
employment laws, whether the requirement is imposed on women or on men.
But because, sexual allusions are so rarely directed by women at men, and
because it is so difficult to envision them as interfering with a man's ability to
function on the job, a legal analysis that insists on symmetry is unlikely to
recognize the detrimental effect that such conduct, when directed by men at
women, has on equal opportunity in employment. It is as a result of this
symmetric analysis that courts have difficulty in recognizing that sexual
harassment that permeates a woman's work environment, but that is not
explicitly linked to employment status, violates Title VII.
While it is theoretically possible that both men and women may be sub-
jected to sexual harassment, such conduct harms women workers in particu-
lar. The most obvious reason that the failure to offer redress for sexual
harassment on the job impacts adversely on working women is that female
employees are frequently in subordinate positions where they can be subjected
to the sexual demands of male supervisors. 108 But even if supervisory and
subordinate positions were allocated more equally, women workers would still
be more vulnerable to sexual coercion by their bosses.'" Males in our society
have the exclusive social right to initiate sexual interaction with others. In the
words of one well known sociologist, it is "relatively 'normal' for males to seek
sexual access to females who are their subordinates."'" Indeed, the assump-
tion of male initiative is so prevalent that researchers of male-female . sexual
interaction uniformly divide their samples along gender lines, defining males
as initiators or "passmakers," and females as the passive "pass receivers. ',111
Standard texts on social etiquette similarly confirm what is common knowl-
edge: that in the realm of purely social interaction, males are invariably the
initiators and females are the recipients. 112 That males, rather than females,
in our society have the social right to initiate sexual relationships ensures that
women bear the brunt of job-related sexual advances.
" 8
 National statistical patterns of employment indicate that in 1974 one out of
seven men was in a managerial or administrative position compared with one out of
twenty women holding such positions. More than one-third of women workers were
employed in clerical positions. 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 4, at
86.
"" See generally SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, supra note 85.
"I) L. TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS 271 (1970).
1 " See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Clarity of the Seduction Situation, and Cavan. Talking
About Sex By Not Talking About Sex, hi THE SOCIAL PsycltoLoGY OF SEX, (WiSeIllati,
1976).
12 See, for example, A. VANDERBILT, E.TiQuErrE (1972).Compare, for example,
the rules for men which deal with such things as asking women to dance. and the
corresponding rules for women which concern such !flings as refusing a dance. Id. at
219. 319. See also the similar pattern evident with respect to teaching adolescent males
to ask for dates and teaching adolescent females to accept or reject engagements
gracefully. Id. at 703, 707.
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As compared to its impact on male employees, sexual harassment leaves a
disproportionately large number of female employees with a range of unde-
sirable choices—acceding to the demands; being dismissed or leaving their
employment before they can advance; or remaining in their jobs with de-
creased chances of future advancement. It therefore constitutes a barrier to
employment and advancement that many women simply cannot over-
come." 3 Women who comply may be faced with the same barrier if the
sexual liaison between subordinate and supervisor later becomes untena-
ble. "4
 In short, sexual harassment is one more reason that many women do
not advance beyond the inferior position they traditionally have held.
In addition to its disproportionate numerical impact, sexual harassment
is likely to have a disproportionate emotional impact on women, which makes
it particularly difficult for them to function effectively in the face of such
treatment. The situation in which a person is asked to exchange sexual serv-
ices for continued employment is uniquely disturbing to women. It is a re-
minder, a badge or incident of a servile status, which women are striving to
leave behind. "5
Women's dependent role has resulted from the interaction of a number
of factors. Women have been denied educational and employment oppor-
tunities, and prohibited from participating in public life in other respects. "6
113 See generally SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, supra note 85.
" 4 Id. at 185.
115 For black women, presumptions of sexual availability are a reminder of the
conditions of their servitude under slavery. In the words of Gerda Lerner, under slav-
ery, in addition to their exploitation as unpaid workers, "[t]he sexual exploitation of
black women by white men was so widespread as to be general.... Black women bred
children to the toaster's profit and were sexually available to any white man who cared
to use them. Mulattoes or especially beautiful black girls were sold at fancy prices as
concubines. BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 44-45 (G.
Lerner ed. 1973).
The condition of women under the institution of marriage has also presupposed
their sexual availability to their husbands. see note 118 infra, and has otherwise been
analogized to slavery. See, e.g., Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, -15
B.U.L. REV. 723, 742-44 (1935): Mill, On the Subjection of Women, ESSAYS ON SEX-
UAL EQUALITY 134 -37 (A. Rossi ed. 197(i) [hereinafter cited as MILLI.
'I" See generally A. Sachs & J. Wilson. SEXISM AND THE LAW 69-132 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as SExism AND Tin: LA•]. The degree and_the nature of the exclu-
sions has varied between different periods in the country's history: as the authors
point. out, for example, the legal position of women was much stronger during the
early colonial period than it was two centuries later. Id, at 69. Nevertheless, even dur-
ing the colonial period women were excluded from certain professions—such as
attorney-at-law—and their participation in a wide variety of occupations frequently
came about because they were substituting for dead or absent husbands. hi. at 71. See
also Bloch, Untangling the Roots of Modern Sex Roles: A Suney of Four Centuries of Change,
4' SIGNS 237, 244 -45, 252 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BLoct-d, arguing that in six-
teenth and seventeenth century America, women were divested of many traditional
sources of authority, qualitative sexual distinctions were undermined, and men and
women assumed more immediately hierarchical relationships in various areas of life
while in the nineteenth century sexual distinctions again sharpened.
Regarding exclusion from educational opportunities specifically„cee Vorchheimer
v. School District of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff 'd by an evenly divided
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As a result, to achieve economic stability, they have had little choice but to
marry. Access to the woman's body has formed an essential element in form-
ing the marital relation. Yet once married, women lost significant rights—the
right to manage or control property or earnings, the right to contract or con-
duct a business, and the right to establish a separate domicile." 7 Women
thus have been able to sustain themselves at least in part by trading on their
sexuality, but at the cost of their legal, economic and physical autonomy. 18
The twentieth century has brought substantial changes in the legal status
of women, and to some extent improved their socio-economic status. Women
have access to the labor market to earn their own living, and theoretically no
longer need to depend upon their sexuality for survival. Presumably, women
are to receive recognition as persons in their own right, valued according to
individual capability and achievement in their chosen realms of endeavor. But
to make a woman's advancement on the job depend on her sexual acquies-
cence is to continue her status as man's property or plaything. And to suggest
that a female employee is of worth only in terms of her gender is to say once
again that she is not entitled to equal opportunity on the job.
court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (exclusion ()I' otherwise qualified female student from all
male high school for the academically gifted nut unconstitutional).
Regarding exclusion from the professions, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a state supreme court's refusal to admit woolen to the
practice of law).
Regarding exclusion of women from the trades. See Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948) (upholding a state statute which prohibited women from bartending unless
they were the wives co - daughters of male bar owners). See generally B. BA RcocK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND
REMEDIES 19-53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK, FREEDMAN. NORTON & Ross].
'' 7 Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 U. Wis. L. REV. 55, 56, 70-73 [hereinafter cited as Pi wERsI Sexism & the Law,
supra note 116; Buten, Su pro DOW 116 BABCOCK, FREEDMAN, NORTON & Ross, .supra
DOW 116, at 562.
ill See note 117 supra.
As of 1979, only three jurisdictions recognized spousal rape. See Comment, The
COM WW1 Law Does Not Support a Marital Exception for Forcible Rape, 5 WomEN's R-rs. L.
REI'. 1181 (1979). See also 65 Am. fur. 241 Rape § 27 (1972): English, The Hnsliand Who
Rapes His Wife, 126 NEW L.	 12 .`23 (1976); Continent, Rape and Rape EaWS : Sexi,sin
Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. Rey. 919 (1973).
The consequences of these various factors is well described by John Stuart Mill:
When we put. together three ihings—first, the natural attraction between
opposite sexes; secondly, the wife's entire dependence on the husband,
every privilege or pleasure she has being either his gift, or depending en-
tirely on his will: and lastly. that. the principal object of human pursuit,
consideration, and all objects of social ambition, can in general be sought.
or obtained by her only through hint, it would be a miracle if' the object of
being attractive to men had not become the polar star of feminine educa-
tion and formation of character. And, this great means of influence over
the minds of' women having been acquirecl, an instinct of' selfishness made
men to avail themselves of it to the utmost as a means of holding women in
subjection. by representing to them meekness, submissiveness, and resigna-
tion of all individual will into the hands of a man. as an essential part of
sexual auractiveness.
MILL, supra note 115, at 141-42.
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That allusions to sexual availability have an especially pejorative meaning
for women is also apparent from our language. An examination of epithets
relating to females indicates that they are primarily references to women in
solely sexual terms, i.e., as the objects of sexual desire."° Moreover, as a
scholar of language has observed, this is not a gender-neutral phenomenon:
Words indicating the station, relationship or occupation of men have
remained untainted over the years. Those identifying women have
repeatedly suffered the indignity of degeneration, many of them be-
coming sexually abusive. It is clearly not the women themselves who
have coined and used these terms as epithets for each other. One
sees today that it is men who describe women in sexual terms and
insult them with sexual slurs, and the wealth of derogatory terms for
women reveals something of their hostility .... [T]he largest cate-
gory of words designating human in sexual terms are those for
women—especially for loose women. I have located roughly a
thousand words and phrases describing women in sexually deroga-
tory ways. There is nothing approaching this multitude for describ-
ing men. 12 °
It is apparent, then, that the making of sexual allusions as well as the
requiring of sexual cooperation reflects stereotypic assumptions concerning
male-female power relations and woman's proper place. So, for example, the
supervisor's sexual demands embody his implict assumption that that is what
his female subordinate is there for, and that to the extent she is unwilling to
cooperate sexually, she is dispensable.
Similarly, sexual allusions, whether "friendly" or hostile, emphasize that
the female is a body, not a person capable of working. The link between
sexual demands and denial of equal employment opportunity is illustrated
vividly by the experiences of women attempting to break into the constuction
trades. Particularly where they are the lone female on the job, craft appren-
tices report a combination of sexual advances, allusions, teasing, jokes and
crude comments. At the same time, they complain of minute scrutiny of their
work and "chivalry" that denies them opportunities to participate in work as-
signments. 121
 Variations on these patterns have been reported when women
enter other male preserves.'" Sexual references and demands, however, are
also directed at women holding traditional jobs.' 23
"" See Schulz., The Semantic Derogation of Women, LANGUAGE AND SEX 67 (B.
Thorne & N. Henley, ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Scrioui]. See also R. Lakoff, LAN-
GUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE 24, 36 (Paperback ed, 1975).
12 ° Scuut.z.„supra note 119. at 71-72.
See, e.g., Affidavits, supra note 71, at Exhibits A ¶ 15-16; B ¶ 17; and D
122 Examples of sexual harassment -in non-traditional jobs are provided by a
recent commentator:
A woman who was transferred from the shoe department of a suburban
branch of a major department store to a downtown store were few women
had ever worked was subjected to a systematic campaign of physical and
sexual assaults by her male co-workers in full view of the public. "On her
20.
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Obviously, there is a range of male on-the-job conduct which in varying
degrees embodies such messages about woman's place. The more explicit the
reference to a woman's sexual identity and the more explicit the demand for
actual performance by the woman, the easier it is to see the minimization of
her contribution as an individual worker. But it is clear that reference to
sexuality—without explicit demands attached—is part of an arsenal of
weapons that serves to exclude women from a male domain.
In terms of bodily privacy, there is, of course, a difference between re-
quiring sexual compliance either to obtain, remain in, or progress in a job,
and subjecting a worker to physical and verbal invitations and sexual allusions.
But in terms of impact on equal employment opportunity, the two types of
sexual harassment are closely related. Had the early court decisions permit-
ting recovery for sexual harassment utilized a concept of discrimination that
illuminated the stereotypic aspects of the prohibited behavior, these simple
hiring and firing cases could have provided a basis for imposing liability for
the behavior at issue in the more elusive work environment cases.
2. Work Environment
Recognizing that sexual advances—even those that stop short of actually
coercing sexual cooperation—invoke woman's historically inferior position,
her socialization as sex objects, and her inability to be seen as a capable
worker, litigants and commentators have argued that sexual harassment, is per
se impermissible. 124 The argument is based on the statutory prohibition on
discriminatory "conditions of employment," 125 and draws on court and EEOC
first day on the job, the assaults, which included hands up her skirt and on
her breast, reached such proportions that a customer complained to the
management and threatened to cancel her charge account," When the
employee complained, "management told her there was nothing that could
or would be done to help her. She quit the job rather than endure the
insults.''
Women, employed in a ship-building plant where yard jobs in skilled
crafts, like welding and shipbuildings, had recently been sex-integrated,
were daily made the victims of abusive and suggestive language, explicit
offers of sex for money, and physical assaults. Refusing or resisting would
sometimes result in oppressive work assignments and job disputes which
ended in dismissals. The result was that where 150 women once held yard
jobs, only 30 or 40 now remain.
Goodman, Sexual Demands on the Job, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 55-56 (1978) thereinafter cited as
GOODMAN]. See also SE:xtim, SHAKF.DowN, supra note 85, at 54-65.
123 See GOODMAN, supra DOW 122, and SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, supra non.: 85, at
90-124.
'" See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 14-27, Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and
Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1976); Note, Employment Discrimination —Sexual
Harassment and Title VII-Female Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal and Physical Advances By
A Male Supervisor Dismissed as Nonactionable—Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y.U.L.
Rev, 148, 153-59 (1976) thereinafter cited as Sexual Harassment and Title VII]: Com-
ment, Civil Rights: Sexual Advances by Male Supervisory Personnel as Actionable under Title
VII, 17 Rev. 409 (1976). The argument is developed with some variations using
slightly different terminology in NiAcKINNoN, supra note 84, at 174-192.
125 See Section 703(a)(1) codified at 42	 § 2000e-2(a)(1). As previously
indicated, an additional argument could be based on the language of § 703(a)(2) pro-
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decisions directed at psychologically debilitating work environments. The
principal authority for this argument is Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers v.
EEOC, 126 a Fifth Circuit case involving the rights of an employee working for
an optical company that segregated its patients on the basis of race. In finding
such segregation unlawful, Judge Goldberg read the phrase "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" to be "an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 127 Further support is
derived from Gray v. Greyhound Lines, Eas1, 128 which recognized the potential
psychological impact on a black employee flowing from the improper limita-
tion of black hiring, and held that such arbitrary treatment was actionable
under Title VII.
It is clear, moreover, in the context of racial and national origin dis-
crimination, that directing racial and ethnic slurs at employees can violate the
fair employment laws. Without specifically referring to the concept of work
environment, first agency decisions' and then court rulings" found de-
hibiting employer practices which "limit" or otherwise adversely affect applicants' or
employees' opportunities because of membership in a protected class. See note 88
supra.
126
 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
127 Id. at 238. Asa recent note says:
Technically, the only issue before the Rogers court was whether the EEOC
should have been granted access to information on the employer's patient
applications. Resolution of that issue, however, required a determination of
whether the practice alleged—patient segregation—could indeed consti-
tute a violation of Title VII. Judge Goldberg and Judge Godbold agreed
that a violation had been alleged, but divided on the nature of that viola-
tion. Judge Goldberg found that the segregation of patients alone could
create an impermissible condition of employment. Judge Godbold opted
for the narrower alternative holding suggested by the EEOC: requiring the
employee "to attend or to have contact with only segregated patients. - was
an act of discrimination directly against the employee.
Sexual Harassment and Title VII, supra note 124. at 154 n.29 (citations omitted). See also
Johnson v. Shreveport Garment CO., 422 F. Stipp. 526 (W.D. La. 1976) (maintenance
of segregated restrooms constitutes an unlawful employment practice); Harrington V.
Vandalia–Butler Bd. of Ed.. 418 F. Stipp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (inferior work
conditions and treatment of female physical education instructor).
"8 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Technically, the issue before the court
in Gray was one of standing.
129
 EEOC Decision, No. 71-1677, April 12. 1971 (ridicule of Polish employee
by co-workers unlawful); EE O C Decision No. 71-720, Dec. 12, 1970 (fOreinan calling
black employee "little black sambo" discriminatory); EEOC Decision No. 72-0779, Dec.
20, 1971 (supervisor called employee "nigger"): EEOC Decision, No. 72-0957: Feb-
ruary 2, 1972 (racially derogatory remarks); EEOC Decision. No. 72-1561, April 12,
1971 (unlawful to require workers to work in an area covered with racially derogatory
graffitti); Rattner v. Trans World Airlines, City of New York Commission on Human
Rights, Decision No. 4135-J, September .11, 1973 (anti-semitic graffini).
1 " Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Stipp. 157 (S.D. Ohio, 1976) (supervisor's
barrage of verbal abuse using anti-semitic terms discriminatory); Croker v. Boeing Co.
(Vertol Div.). 437 F. Stipp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (employer liable for harassment where
supervisors conducted unusually close supervision, made comments concerning dress
and used racially demeaning language). See also Johnson v. Lillie Rubin Affiliates, Inc.,
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rogatory remarks and graffiti discriminatory. More recently the City of Buf-
falo was found liable under Title VII for the "working environment heavily
charged with racial discrimination" faced by black firefighters and police of-
ficers as a result of racial slurs from fellow officers, police radio broadcasts,
bulletin board displays, and the circulation of Ku Klux Klan cartoons."'
The courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize that sexual
harassment may lead to a similarly charged work environment. As already
noted, faced with allegations clearly linking the demand for sexual favors with
employment status, neither the Tomkins court nor the Barnes court was re-
quired to address the work environment argument. 132
 Indeed, the Tomkins
court expressly declined to reach the question.'" But subsequent decisions
by and large have rejected sexual harassment claims in the absence of explicit
employment ramifications. 134
Apparently only one decision has recognized the debilitating effects of
sexual allusions, as well as their role in maintaining a sex-segregated work
force as a violation of Title VII. The case, Kyriazi v. Western Electric Com-
pany, 35
 involved a successful class-action challenge to a wide range of hiring,
5 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CC H), EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 8542 (1). Tenn, 1973) (referring to
black women by their first names While using "Miss" or "Mrs." for white women ra-
cially discriminatory): Murry v. American Standard, lnc., 373 F. Supp. 716 (F.D. La.
1973) (calling black employee "boy" discriminatory).
131 United States v. City of Buffalo Fire and Police Depts.. 457 F. Supp. 612,
635 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
In establishing the employment ramifications of the sexual demand in Tom-
inns, the Third Circuit pointed to the context of the advances—a lunch to discuss
plaintiff's upcoming job evaluations and promotion possibilities—and her explicit alle-
gation that the supervisor had stated that her continued success and ad 1,r/1111:el/le /II
were dependent upon her agreeing to his sexual demands. Tomkins v. PSE&G Co.,
568 F.2d 1044. 1047 (3d Cir. 1977). The Barnes court referred to plaintiff's allegations
that her supervisor repeatedly solicited her sexual favors and implied her employment
status would he enhanced by cooperation and ultimately relied On the plaintiff's "thesis
that her supervisor retaliated against her by abolishing her job when she resisted his
sexual advances." Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983. 985 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
133 Ton ► kins v. PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d 1044. 1046 /1.1 (1977).
134
 See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 19 FEP Gas. 933 (1st Cir. 1979) (insufficient nexus
between romantic .overtures by department bead and terminatiim); Cordes v. County
of Yavapai. 17 FEP Gas. 1224 (D. Ariz. 1978) (refusal of prior sexual advance not tied
to subsequent retaliatory termination); Keeley v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 17
FEP Cals. 482 (W.D, Okla. 1978) (no Title VII violation where vice president's touchin(
female employee and telling ''dirty jokes" did not condition employment-related ben-
efits on employee's acquiescence in vice-president's misbehavior). Smith v. Rust En-
gineer Co.. 18 Extrt.. PRAC. GuinE(CC14) (N.D. Ala. 1978) (advance by co-worker lack-
ing employment consequences not actionable under Tide VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 19
EMI'. PRAC. DEC. 1I 9154 (D.D.C. 1979) (although plaintiff had been subject to advances
by numerous supervisors, the court found no Title VII cause of' action in absence of
specific employment consequences). By contrast. newly promulgated EEOC guidelines
do recognize work environment permeated by sexual harassment to be violative of
Tide VII. 45 Fed. Reg. 25025 (April 11, 1980). g. Conte v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.
Stipp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) vac. and remanded on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977).
13 ' 461 E. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
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promotion, training, and layoff practices.'" Along with statistical and other
evidence of massive systemic discrimination by Western Electric, the court re-
viewed the claims of the named plaintiff, an engineer who the court con-
cluded had been underrated, underpaid, denied promotions, and terminated
in violation of Title V11. 137
 And though not establishing a Title VII violation
in and of itself, a significant portion of the testimony regarding Kyriazi's indi-
vidual claim concerned "teas[ing] and torment[ing]" by her co-workers in the
form of speculations and "wagers concerning her virginity," and an obscene
cartoon 138
 designed to "humiliate [her] as a woman as part of an overall ef-
fort by them to make life generally unpleasant for her." 139
Little sense can be made out of this assemblage of authority. Courts rec-
ognize that the work environment can be discriminatorily polluted by certain
practices, but they insist that claims of sexual harassment must be tied to
specific retaliatory consequences. Obviously the cases cannot be harmonized
by a narrow reading of Title VII that would limit the meaning of impermissi-
ble "terms, conditions and privileges of employment" to those involving
clear-cut ramifications for employment status. On the contrary, it would seem
that the courts do accept the concept of psychological conditions of employ-
ment where they conceive of the practice being challenged as one that
amounts to true discrimination. Thus recognizably hostile remarks—be they
racial, ethnic, or, if the thrust of Kyriazi is developed, sexual—are impermissi-
ble, whether or not they are part of a larger pattern of discrimination.'"
Practicing racial segregation—be it in patient services or restrooms—is
likewise impermissible."' But what is significant about such practices is the
"" As certified the class consists of approximately 7,500 women i.e. all females
who are or have been employed or sought employment at Western Electric's Kearny
operation since June, 1971. (Personal communication with Esta Bigler of Vladeck &
Elias, 1501 Broadway, New York, NY, attorneys for plaintiffs, June 29, 1979).
137
 461 F. Supp. at 945.
' 38 Id. at 934. This was the basis for finding a conspiracy to deprive her of her
federal right to be free from sex-based employment discrimination in violation of 42
U.S.C. 1985(3). But rf.• Great Am. Fecrl Savings & Loan Ass'n et al v. Navotny, 442
U.S. 366, 99 S. Ct. '2345 (1979) (since Title VII provides the exclusive federal remedy
for sex discrimination in private employment plaintiff has no cause of action under §
1985(3)).
139
 Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894. 935 (D.N.J. 1978).
14 " Compare, for example, the trial judge's reaction to the harassment in Kyriazi
which from context is clearly hostile, 461 F. Supp. 894, 935, with the reaction of the
same judge to the sexual advances at issue in Tomkins: "While sexual desire animated
the parties, or at least one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim of
abuse." 442 F. Supp, 553, 556.
Interestingly, a psychiatrist who has reviewed a number of instances of sexual
harassment has observed:
[I]t often seemed that. the male aggressor did not actually wish to have
sexual relations, nor even an extended social contact, with his female
target. Indeed, one often suspected that he chose his victim precisely be-
cause he knew she would never agree u his suggestions. His intention was
merely to tease. The target, however, took him seriously and became upset.
Such harassment. has been called "little rape" by one author.
C.BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER 27 (1976) (hereinafter cited as BRODSKY].
141 Evoking the historical specter of Jim Crow, unequal treatment of this sort
easily gives rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. See note 127 supra.
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psychological debilitation that flows from the environment they create, not the
class-based animus that prompts them. 142- Thus with an additional theory of
discrimination which focuses on the consequences of stereotype-reinforcing
practices for equal employment opportunity, instances of sexual harassment
might also be perceived as truly discriminatory. 143
Should the debilitating effects of sexual harassment on work environ-
ment be recognized as discriminatory, a question arises as to the quantum of
harassment which should be deemed necessary to violate Title VII. 144 Two
countervailing considerations come into play in answering that question. On
the one hand, for understandable reasons, men may genuinely not know that
their conduct is offensive and debilitating to women. On the other hand,
women are extremely vulnerable, and to expect them to express their rejec-
tion of a man is often to expect them to invite retaliation. 15 In this respect,
the analogy between sexual harassment and rape is particularly close:
A victim who resists [rape] is more likely to be killed, but unless she
fights back, it is not rape, because she cannot prove coercion. With
sexual harassment, rejection proves that the advance is unwanted,
but also is likely to call forth retaliation, thus forcing the victim to
bring intensified injury upon herself in order to demonstrate she is
injured at all.'"
Given these competing pressures, and in the absence of an objective
means of measuring the degree to which such harassment interferes with per-
142 The same psychiatrist has recently written of harassment by people: "Con-
scious or unconscious harassment ultimately relates to the issue of control. Who
has sufficient power to keep someone else in line?" BRODSKY, supra note 140, at 47.
143
 Such a theory would seem necessary to explain certain EEOG decisions. See,
e.g., 1968-1973 CCH EEOC, DEC. ¶ 6324, at 4580 (1971) (practice of referring to
women as "girls" violates Title VII); 1968-1973 CCH EEOC DEC. ¶ 6346 (197I);
1968-1973 CCH EEOC DEc. ¶ 6085 (1969) (racial or ethnic jokes violate Title VII).
Accord, EEOC Decision No. 70-683, 2 FEP Cas. 606 (1970): EEOC Decision No. 71-
909, 3 FEP Gas. 269 (1970); EEOC Decision No. 71-1442, 3 FEP Cas. 493 (1971):
EEOC Decision No. 72-0649, 4 FEP Cas. 441 (1971).
Interestingly, however, the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment describe the
impermissible environment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment (2) submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment deci-
sions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
45 Fed. Reg. 25025 (April 11, 1980).
144 See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.
1977) (ethnic slurs did not rise to level necessary to constitute violation of Title VII).
This problem does not arise in the case where job status is explicitly conditioned on
sexual compliance.
14 ' MACKINNON, supra note 86, at 45-46.
146 Id. at 46.
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formance, 147
 it seems fair to require as a general matter that the woman at-
tempt to make known to the harasser that she finds his conduct offensive. In
extreme cases, however, the harasser should not, need to he advised that his
conduct is unduly intrusive or humiliating. Included in this category would be
physical advances, such as grabbing the woman's breasts or buttocks, putting
hands under the women's clothes or attempting to undress her, or masturbat-
ing in front of her; 148 and verbal abuse, such as references to the size Of the
woman's breasts or the man's penis.'" In determining whether the woman
1 " The Working Women's Institute, 593 Park Avenue, New York, New York,
an agency which counsels victims of sexual harassment anticipates undertaking a re-
search project. to determine whether such a measure is possible. Personal Communica-
6on, Susan Meyer, Executive Director, Aug. 13, 1979.
148 For example, one woman quoted in SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, Supra note 85, at
84 describes an incident at a Christmas party which she attended because it was pan of
her job to supervise all social functions for the laboratory:
Al one point the man asked her to dance; she refused several times be-
cause of her past experiences and because she was tnanaging the party. He
insisted. however, and yanking her arm he pulled her forcibly onto the
dance floor, where he then shoved his hands under her sweater and vest,
pushing them up and exposing her back and rubbing her bare skin.
Another describes a job interview, and subsequent work environment:
"In the first interview, Mr. S., who was fifty-four, sat in front of me; he
was sitting at the end of the table handling his penis. I tried to pretend
that nothing happened. He offered me the job but. I turned it clown."
About two weeks later Genevieve still hadn't found a job so she checked to
see if the job was still open. As it turned out, the man had hired another
woman, although he had already fired her, and Genevieve got the job, but
only after agreeing to a salary of $185; he had been paying $235. The
sexual harassment began on the second day, when dictation involved her
new boss sitting alongside her and rubbing his leg against hers. "I moved
away, but his leg just kept coming over and over. I thought I'd fall off the
chair." The following day the Executive Vice-President, who was forty-
eight, played with himself as Genevieve delivered the mail. "1 ran hack to
my desk and collapsed, but I said nothing as I couldn't figure out what
prompted it." Genevieve eventually determined the politic way to handle
the entire situation was to complain to her boss about the other man's be-
havior. "He answered me by saying the only reason any mart would behave
like that is because you're probably no good and have heel' through the
gutter. Those are his exact words. I was so shocked the only thing I could
think was that he knew I was single. Nothing changed; about a fortnight




 See, e.g., Fuller v. Williams, No. A 7703-04007 (Portland, Oregon) described
in MACKINNON, supra note 86, at 43, 168-69. Other statements complained of include:
"Did you just have sex with your husband? What was it like?" "Is that all
you do is have sex with your husband?", "Do you sleep with your hus-
band?", "Do you sleep naked with yciur husband?" pointing out that
women were "better off in bed," meant "only for the bedroom or the
kitchen." that plaintiff and other women employees were "only interested
in sleeping with the male employees." that the former photofinishing "girl"
"was a good lay. We screwed her down in the basement. We all had sex
with her.", "Do you think your husband would let me take his pants off in
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in fact had given the harasser sufficient notice that. his actions were unwel-
come, a court should be particularly sensitive to circumstances such as the
presence of customers preventing the woman from making her reaction
known. t ' 6 Thus Title VII should prohibit acts of sexual harassment that the
harasser knew or should have known were unwelcome.
3. Employer Liability
The question of the proper extent of employer liability for employee
conduct is also crucially affected by the perception of what constitutes dis-
crimination. Employer liability for employee conduct is considered fair and
essential to effective anti-discrimination laws when the challenged conduct is
recognized as presenting a real obstacle to equal employment opportunity. A
black man fired by a bigoted foreman, for example, is not expected to seek
redress from a well-intentioned plant manager, nor need he point to a com-
pany policy behind the supervisor's act.. There is no general requirement that
an employee exhaust internal remedies before initiating a Title VII complaint
in order to implicate the employer. Yet such requirements have been imposed
in sexual harassment cases, largely because existing concepts of discrimination
shed so little light on the relation between sexual harassment and equal
employment opportunity.
On its face, the question of employer liability is determined by statutory
language. Title VII, for instance, makes it unlawful "for an employer" to do
certain proscribed acts,''' and defines "employer - to include with certain ex-
front of my camera if I lined him up with a nude female model?", "Tell
your husband I want to do nodes of him. I must photograph him," that.
plaintiff was unfit to perform her duties, that women, including plaintiff,
were "not fit for the photography business," "incompetent.," "unable to
work under pressure without bursting,into tears," "couldn't take it." ''Often
stayed home due to headaches," "can't be relied upon," "possess a lesser
ability to photograph," "don't know which end of a camera is up," "get
shows in galleries by sleeping with gallery directors," "We've never had a
girl selling cameras here. It might be an interesting experiment." "We can't
hire a woman who has a boyfriend or a husband and have them last any
length of time because their partners become very jealous of all us good
looking males."
' 50 The formulation presented here substantially conforms to that suggested in
the student comment on Come v. Bausch & Lomb.
To allow one incident to suffice would create a problem in the case of
sexual advances because, while derogatory epithets are generally known to
be unwelcome, prior to his first. advance a supervisor may not realize that.
his attentions will be. Where sexual attentions take an extreme or coercive
form, however, even one incident may be one too many. A single physical
advance made in an offensive or humiliating manner may have serious
psychological consequences—as may an isolated verbal advance, for exam-
ple, if made in conjunction with knowledge of a request for promotion.
For such incidents, Title VII should offer immediate protection. To hold
that an isolated incident is proscribed by Title VII only if extreme or coer-
cive seems a reasonable course, since few women would bring suit after
only one unwelcome advance unless it could be thus characterized.
Sexual Harassment and Title VII, supra note 124, at 164 11.76.
' 5 ' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ( MO).
Id.
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ceptions "any agent" of a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
having the requisite number of employees.' 52 Personnel actions explicitly af-
fecting job status, such as hiring, firing or promoting an employee may be
based on the recommendations of a supervisor, but are ultimately taken by
the employer. Other actions, such as providing a worker with less favorable
assignments or working conditions, do not. implicate the employer so con-
spicuously. Whether, in these different situations, the employer is discriminat-
ing against an individual with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment or is limiting an employee or applicant in a way which would tend
to deprive the individual of employment opportunities or is otherwise affecting
the individual's status as an employee is inevitably a question of social policy. 153
In resolving these questions of employer liability, two principles serve to
organize the relevant policy considerations. On the one hand, anti-
discrimination laws must be effective in achieving their end of equal employ-
ment opportunity. And on the other, they must be perceived as fair. These
twin concerns underlie the general rule that employers are responsible for the
discriminatory acts of their supervisory employees, whether or not the actions .
were known, approved by, or contrary to employer policy. 154 The concern
for effectiveness was captured well in the words of one court: "little, if' any,
progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the cor-.
porate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual employee ac-
tion."'''" But such a rule is not just practical, it also seems fair, because the
supervisor is, at least in theory, perceived to be someone whom the employer
controls and someone whom the employer has chosen to promote. Moreover,
vicarious liability seems equitable because the employer clearly benefits from
being able to assign the power to make personnel decisions to the supervisory
employee—though presumably not from the discrimination itself.'''"
Additionally. the costs in lost productivity and damage to persons that
result from discrimination can be analogized to those flowing from the more
standard type of industrial accident. Like the costs of industrial accidents, they
152
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
15" While tort and agency concepts may help illuminate the policy choice to he
made, the traditional law of tort and agency cannot be imported wholesale into the law
of employment discrimination without significantly undercutting its effectiveness. So.
for example. had common law fault concepts rather than later notions of strict liability
been read into Title VII, Griggs and all the progress it represents would not have been
possible. See generally Blumrosen. Strangers in Paradise,- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and the
Concept of Discrimination, 71 Mutt. L. Rix, 59. 67-95 (1072) [hereinafter cited as Stran-
gers in Ariaradisel.
154
 Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc.. 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir.
1972); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348. 355-59 (5th Cir. 1972); Kober v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973); Ostapowicz v. Johnson
Bronze Co.. 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.1). Pa. 1073). aff'd in part and vacated in part On
other grounds 541 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1976); Stewart v. General Motors Corp.. 452 F.2d
445. 450 (7th Cir. 1976),
155
 Tidwell v. American Oil Co„ 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (1). Utah 1071).
1511 At times of course, employers may seek to benefit from discriminatory
policies leading to sexual harassment, as when the employer reqiiires a female
employee to wear a scanty uniform.
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may be reduced by encouraging the employer to introduce prophylactic rules,
for the employer, if anyone, is in both instances in the best position to prevent
the injury by taking care in selecting, training and establishing rules for its
employees. i 57 Like the costs of industrial accidents, the costs of discrimina-
tion also may be to be certain extent inevitable as we make our way from a
society steeped in prejudice to the bias-free world we envision as ultimately
possible.' 58 Given our commitment to make that transition, it would seem
essential to recognize that there are costs en route, and, to determine who is
best able to bear these interim costs. There is little reason to believe that
members of the historically disfavored classes should be the ones to carry this
burden. 159
The general rule imposing liability for discriminatory practices without a
showing of involvment on the part of the upper echelons of management is
not accepted uniformly in the area of sexual harassment. Even for those cases
explicity involving employment status, as opposed to work environment, some
courts appear hesitant to impose liability without a showing that the employer
knew of and acquiesced in the demand for sexual acts. Of the circuit courts
that have addressed the question,'" two have indicated their willingness to
follow the general rule in cases of harassment. Indeed, the Barnes majority
157 It is apparent that we do not assume there are innate limits on what re-
sponsible parties can achieve. For we are certainly willing to insist. even on pain of
individual criminal liability, that those in a "position of authority[s] in business enter-
prises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that
supports them," both "seek out and remedy violations when they occur" and "imple-
ment measures that will insure that violations [of the pure food laws) will not occur.
U.S. v. Pat- k. 421 U.S. 658. 672 (1975). At least according to dissenting opium] of
Justice Stewart, this is a duty which exceeds that imposed by the common law of negli-
gence. Id. at 683. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' 5 " The history of worker's compensation helps illuminate this point. At com-
mon law, the very limited duties of master toward servant combined with the formida-
ble obstacles posed by the defenses to such duties resulted in the great. majority of
industrial accidents going uncompensated. Even more than an effort to foster safe
working conditions. the shift to strict employer liability under worker's compensation
legislation represents a significant change in social/economic policy. No longer would
industrial development be encouraged by making the burden on employers as light as
possible. Rather human injuries must now be recognized as a producer's cost of pro-
duction. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs (4th ed. 11)71) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER).
'"" Indeed this would seem to be the justification for requiring an employer to
adopt narrowly tailored selection procedures under the Griggs rationale. Alternatives
to tests having a disparate impact may be more costly, if ultimately More accurate.
Certainly test validation and other methods of showing job relatedness have their costs.
But these are costs we expect the employer to shoulder—and pass on—in the interests
of equal employment opportunity. But see Beazer v. New York City Trans Audi., 438'
U.S. 904 (1978).
"" Miller v. Bank of America. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. PSE&G Co„ 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977):
Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). Although
faced with a question involving sexual harassment: the First Circuit has not reached
this question. See Fisher v. Flynn. 19 FEP Gas. 932 (lst. Cir. 1979).
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went out of its way to make clear its view on this issue."' But the impact of
the majority's opinion is somewhat blunted by the separate concurring opin-
ion of Judge MacKinnon.'" Judge MacKinnon would limit. the employer's
liability to managerial misconduct, such as knowingly ratifying the supervisor's
conduct, misleading the employee regarding her complaint, or retaliating
against her for complaining.'"
More recently, in Miller v. Bank of America , 1 " the Ninth Circuit con-
fronted allegations by a black woman that she had been fired because she
refused her supervisor's demand for "sexual favors from ... a 'black
chick.' " 1 " Assuming, without deciding, that the discharge was on account of
sex within the meaning of Section 703(a)(1),"" the court held that the Bank
could be found liable under the doctrine of respoPuleat superior in the instant
case
where the action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized
to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or
recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to
have done violates company policy." 7
The Miller court reasoned that Title VII defined wrongs that are a type
of tort„ and that should "[t]he usual rule, that an employer is liable for the
torts of its employees, acting in the course of - their employment" not apply to
such torts, "an enormous loophole" would be created in the statute.'" Im-
plicit in this holding is a finding on the allegations before it that the super-
visor was acting within the scope of' his employment. Not all judges share this
view.'" Faced with practically identical allegations. Judge MacKinnon wrote:
The present case offers no suggestion that the sexual harassment
was even arguably within the scope of employment and certainly it
would not be so understood by any federal employee. The sexual
harassment furthered no objective of the government agency, nor
" 1 Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 993. The court did, however, suggest that
in keeping with the general rule, the employer may be relieved of responsibility where
the supervisor's acts which contravened company policy were rectified on discovery. Id.
r"2 Id. at 995-1001.
1 "a Id. at 1001.
"4
 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
"5 Id. at 212. The complaint also alleged discrimination on the basis of race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
"" 600 F.2d at 212 n.l.
1117 Id. at 213.
8
" 9 The Miller court cites both Barnes and Tomkins as supporting its view. Id. As
discussed infra, this reliance on Tomkins would seem misplaced. Although the district
court in Tomkins suggested respondeat superior would apply were sexual harassment dis-
criminatory, it did not decide the scope of employment question. See Tomkins v.
PSE&G Co., 422 I: . Supp. 553, 556 n.l. See also Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance
Co. 17 FEP Cas. § 482 (W.I). Okla. 1978): Price v. Lawton Furniture Co., 16 EMP.
PRAC. GUIDE (CCH), EMP. PRAC. DEC. II 8342 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Bundy v. Jackson, 19
EMP. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH), EMP. PRAC. DEC. 9154 (I),I).C. 1979).
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was it part of the supervisor's actual or ostensible authority, nor was
it even within the outermost boundaries of what could be perceived
as his apparent authority. 170
Different perceptions of what the wrong was may account for the difference
in the two views. The Miller court, perhaps because it. had assumed without
extended consideration that the firing was discriminatory, apparently saw the
"tort" as a wrongful discharge, indistinguishable from other discriminatory
discharges. The supervisor's involvement in that clearly employment-related
act justified employer liability."' judge MacKinnon, on the other hand,
failed to see the connection between sexual advances and employment oppor-
tunity, even when the opportunity was truncated upon rejection of the ad-
vance.' 72
Additionally, the Miller court, rejecting the bank's argument that the
plaintiff's failure to utilize internal grievance mechanisms available under the
bank's policies should preclude suit, "decline[d] to read an exhaustion of
company remedies requirement into Title VII."'" Here the court relied on
cases rejecting analogous exhaustion requirements as not being among the
preconditions to suit specified by Congress.'"
The Third and Fourth Circuits were less venturesome. The Third Cir-
cuit, finding in the sexual harassment decisions to date a requirement that the
term or condition of employment must be imposed "either directly or vicari-
ously" in a discriminatory manner,'" relied in Tomkins on allegations in the
'" Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Corne v.
Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
171
 Query whether this is properly termed vicarious liability since the firing is
ultimately an act of the employer.
171
 Barnes v. Comic. 561 F.2d 983, 995-997 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring). Even assuming the supervisor was not acting within the scope of his
employment, liability may arguably be imposed anyway. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or
AGENCY § 219(2) (1958) imposing liablity on the master in situations where the master
intended the conduct or its consequences; the master was negligent or reckless; the
conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master; or the servant purported to act
on behalf of the master and there was reliance on apparent authority or the agency
relation aided in accomplishing the tort. Arguably the duty not to discriminate is
non-delegable and thus not excepted from employer liability. See Marr v. Rife, 503
F.2c1 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1974) (Title VIII; Civil Rights Act of 1968); United States v.
Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Stipp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in relevant part 509
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).
It may also be argued that the employer cannot evade liability since it was the
agency relationship which enabled the employer to carry out the discriminatory act.
See, e.g., Bowman v. Home Life Insurance Company of America, 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1957). But see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, j.,
concurring).
'" Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
174
 Id. citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 798-99 (1973)
(EEOC finding of "reasonable cause" not a prerequiste to suit under Title Vi I);
Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419, 421 (9th Cir. 1978); Gibson v. Local 40,
Supercargoes and Checkers, Etc., 543 F.2(1 1259, 1266 n.I4 (9th Cir. 1976); Oubichon
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1973) (employee need
not exhaust union remedies as prerequisite to suit).
Tomkins v. PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977).
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complaint charging the company with actual or constructive knowledge of the
supervisor's likely conduct.'" The court also referred to the company's fail-
ure to take prompt and remedial action after acquiring such knowledge.' 77
In view of the particular allegations before the court, and of the possibility of
"constructive knowledge," however, this reference would not seem to amount
to a requirement that the complaining employee exhaust internal grievance
mechanisms, or even explicitly inform management of her supervisor's de-
mands. Thus while employer knowledge of some sort appears necessary, the
opinion actually leaves the contours of vicarious liability open to further
definition. In Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., the Fourth Circuit, while
not expressly addressing the issue in its brief opinion, appeared to condition
liability on "an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of compelling
female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male super-
visors ...." 178
Lower courts appear even more willing 'to require managerial involve-
ment. For example, one district court has explicitly "decline[d] to follow the
holding in Barnes that an employer is automatically and vicariously liable for
all discriminatory acts of its agents or supervisors. [although it. did] hold that.
an employer has an affirmative duty to investigate complaints of sexual
harassment and deal appropriately with the offending personnel." 17 "
Another district court has stated flatly, "[s]exual advances by male employees
toward female employees do not amount to sex discrimination by an employer
unless the employer knows about the discriminatory conduct and either au-
thorizes or acquiesces in it. ' 8 "
There are two probable explanations for the special treatment accorded
sexual harassment with respect to employer liability. First, despite their words,
the courts fail truly to comprehend sexual harassment as discrimination. Sec-
ond, they are steeped in a male perspective which presupposes that charges of
male sexual misconduct are made easily by females, and are disproved with
great difficulty by males. Special safeguards protecting males are, therefore,
perceived to be in order.
17' See Complaint at 11 24, Toinkins v. PSE&G Co., 422 F. Stipp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976) (Defendant. PSE&G Co. and certain of its agents knew or should have known
that [such] incidents would take place).
177 Id. at 11 111 25-34.
178
 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). The one paragraph per curium opinion seems
to construe the complaint and exhibits before it so as to lied the allegations the court
considers the minimum sufficient to state a cause of action.
17" \Milford v. J.T. Barnes & Co,, 441 F. Stipp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich., S.D.
1977).
"" The position stated by the district court in Miller was even more extreme.
No Tide VII claim, the court said, is stated in the absence of specific factual allegations
describing an employer policy which imposes or permits a consistent—as distinguished
from isolated—conditioning of employment on acquiescence in sexual advances. Miller
v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Calif. 1976). See also Necley v. American
Fid. Assurance Co., 17 FEY C.AS. 482 (W.D. Okla. 1978) Cf. Williams V. Saxbe, 413 F.
Stipp. 654, 66 (D.D,C, 1976) (cause of action exists where plaintiff's allegations amount
to a policy or practice of imposing the condition).
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Certainly there are differences between sexual harassment and other
conduct considered discriminatory; and so long as the perception of employ-
ment barriers is tied to the three presently accepted concepts of discrimina-
tion, it is unlikely that the full impact of sexual harassment will be recognized.
First, the search for an evil motive bogs down in the confusion among
genuine sexual attraction,'" rote responses to the presence of a non-club
member, 182
 and hostility, whether overt or not.'" Second, a focus on un-
equal treatment raises the specter of male subordinates subjected to sexual
advances from their female superiors, and then permits the harm to be mea-
sured in terms of the injury these hypothetical men would suffer. Thus mea-
sured, the harm is likely to be found trivial. Third, the neutral rule with
disparate impact standard diverts attention from the individual action, and
reinforces the illusion that fair employment laws address systemic discrimina-
tion only. What is needed is a concept of discrimination that helps to recog-
nize the nature and degree of harm, rather than obscuring its fundamental
qualities. With such a concept, the concomitant need to make fair employment
legislation effective should lead to the broad notion of employer liability that
applies generally in discrimination cases.
The notion that women are inclined to bring false or unfair charges
against men for sexual misconduct is familiar from both criminal and tort law.
In the criminal area, it is responsible for the special corroboration require-
ments in the law of rape. 184
 In the tort field, it is associated closely with the
statutory abolition of "heart balm" torts, such as seduction and alienation of
affections."' And it is a recurrent theme in the early sexual harassment
decisions."'
There is, of course, good reason to believe that the contrary is true, that.
is, that many legitimate complaints go unmade. "7
 In addition to the repri-
' 81
 A growing body of feminist and non-feminist literature argues persuasively
that sexual attraction plays little or no role in repeated. unreciprocated or coerced
sexual advances. See, e.g., M. AStIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 129-161 (1971). A.
MEDEA K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 78 29-36 (1974); C. HURSCH, THE TROUBLE
wren RAPE (1977).
"2 See KANTER, St‘pra Hole 66.
'"" Compare, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) and
King v. International Laborers. Local 818. 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971).
184 See, e.g., People v. Rincon-Pinecla, 14 Cal, 3d 867, 874, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
126, 538 P.2c1 247, 254 (1975); Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L. J. 1365 (1972); Lid•ig, The Case Jr Repeal of the Sex Corroboration
Requirement in New York. 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 378 (1970); Note. Rape Instructions—
Requiring Jury to Examine Rape Victim's Testimony with Caution is Inappropriate to Modern
Trial Proceedings, 16 SANTA CLARA I.,. REV. 69 f (1976). See generally BABCOCK, FREED-
MAN, NORTON AND Ross, supra note 114, at 819-75 (1975).
A related problem in rape trials is the extent. to which evidence as to the victim's
prior sexual conduct is admissible. Similar issues arise in harassment cases. See Medan
v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (1). Colo. 1978) (evidence as to plaintiffs
sexual relations with other employees admitted, though ultimately termed irrelevant).
182 See Prosser, SlIpIlL note 158, at 887. MAcKINNoN, supra note 86, at 169-70.
1 " See, e.g., Miller v, Bank of America, 418 F. Stipp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Tomkins v. PSE&G Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (1).N.J, 1976). See generally MACKIN-
NON, SU/ira note 86, at 95-99.
1N7 See MAcKINNoN, SU pal note 86, at 95-97: SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, supra note
85, at 22-27.
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sals risked by all discrimination complainants, a woman charging sexual
harassment inevitably risks the counter charge that she invited this, and
perhaps other, incidents. She may be greeted with condescension, ridicule and
disbelief, compounding the humiliation and intimidation of the original inci-
dent. Since many women have internalized the view that they are to blame,
shame and guilt, as well as concern for the aggressor's honor, further inhibit
reporting. Underreporting in the analogous case of rape is well known, ' 88 no
doubt for similar reasons. But whether underreporting is likely or not, what is
really at issue is the complainant's credibility. There would seem to be no
reason, other than a sexist stereotype of women, why the issue of credibility
should not be (leak with in the same manner as other issues of credibility—by
the trier of fact. Here again, a new approach to discrimination may be help-
ful. To the extent that the court determines the conduct alleged amounts to
discrimination, it uses a theory that sharpens its awareness of stereotypes, and
it is less likely to impose unwarranted and sex-based obstacles to recovery.
There remains the question of whether, as between employer and sexual
harassment complainant, it is fair to impose liability on the corporation for
the individual acts of employees, which simply may reflect societal condition-
ing, rather than conscious hostility. ' 8 " The argument for distinguishing con-
scious hostility from social conditioning for purposes of imposing vicarious
liability must rest on one of two propositions. Either it is assumed that the
means of controlling or eliminating the detrimental consequences of class-
based animosity—as opposed to social conditioning—are available to the
employer, or conscious hostility is considered sufficiently aberrant and offen-
sive that it is somehow fair to single out these costs for the employer to hear.
Both propositions, of course, assume that it is possible to tell the differ-
ence between class-based animosity and social conditioning, which presumes
different roles and spheres of action for members of different groups. The
assumption is questionable—particularly since we often attribute prejudicial
attitudes to environmental influences.'" To the extent that it implies that
hostile acts may be recognized more easily and therefore may be controlled
more readily by the employer, it may build in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Cer-
tainly, the employer is in no better position to know whether antipathy to the
complainant's class as opposed to a rejected advance was responsible for an
188 United States Department of Justice, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. CRIME
REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1977 at 15 (1978). The Uniform Crime Re-
ports attribute this underreporting to the victim's fear of the assailant and sense of
embarrassment over the incident. Id.
"9
 While sexual attraction may play a role in the behavior, it is societal mores
which authorize the male to act aggressively on the basis of that attraction, and which
place the obligation on the female to control male behavior. Thus courts which attrib-
ute sexual harassment to "personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerisms," or "personal
urges" miss the mark. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161. 163
(D. Ariz. 1975). For a thoughtful discussion of the meanings of the term "personal," see
MAcKus:NoN, supra note 86, at 83-90.
141 ALLPORT, supra note 69, at 22 1-40.
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employee's unfavorable work evaluations.'" The notion that hostile acts,
once recognized, are more easily prevented or corrected by the employer is
also questionable. People of good will who act from social conditioning may
well be more amenable to changing their ways than are those steeped in
animosity once the detrimental consequences of those ways are pointed out.
The notion that it is somehow fair to impose vicarious liability only for
those unusual and unsympathetic adverse acts prompted by evil motive seems
to amount to no more than a belief that an employer cannot be expected to
absorb all the costs of its enterprise. "2 But. even if this notion were correct,
the particular limitation is illogical. Again, selecting animosity as the basis for
limiting liability must be premised on a view that such discrimination is in
some way more serious. But with regard to the seriousness of an act the only
sensible distinction is one between the adverse actions which employees can
try to ignore and those which inevitably intrude on their job functioning.
Not being hired, promoted, or favorably evaluated is difficult to work
around—irrespective of the motivation which lies behind the adverse action.
Minor insults, on the other hand, may be absorbed—though at some cost.
While a distinction of this sort may justify some limitation on employer liabil-
ity for work environment,' 83 it cannot justify precluding employer liability for
the non-hostile acts of supervisory employees which nevertheless have clear-
cut consequences for job status.
Employer liability for sexual harassment. that permeates the work envi-
ronment, but that is not explicitly tied to job status, may present. a different.
case: for in this area law of sexual harassment may not depart so drastically
from the law regarding other types of harassment. Yet here, too, an ex-
panded understanding of the barriers to equal opportunity in employment
may lead to an expanded understanding of the proper bounds of employer
liability.
judge MacKinnon probably provides an accurate statement of the law
when he describes a spectrum ranging from "a supervisor's persistent use of
racial epithets" which "would undoubtedly lead to an employer's Title VII
liability" to "a foreman's unprovoked and unforeseeable attack upon the black
workers on a particular job" for which the employer would not be liable.' 9  It
"" In his concurring (pinion in Barnes, judge MacKinnon rather inexplicably
asserts the contrary. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In both
cases, the employer will he in the position Of attempting to determine whether the
supervisor's judgment had a legitimate basis. As compared to the complaining
employee, the employer is better able to answer this question primarily because it has
access to information about similar judgments concerning other employees, and not
because the employer has any real way of knowing in either case what transpired
between the supervisor and complaining employee.
1"2 In refuting the employer's claims in Miller that it should not be liable for
the actions of its supervisors, the Ninth Circuit analogized the bank's responsibility to
that of a taxi company which would be liable not only for the negligent driver but for
the intentional harm caused by an enraged driver. Miller v. Bank of America, 600
F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
"a The case law makes clear, however, that it does not entirely preclude such
liability. See discussion in text surrounding notes 135-39 supra.
1 h' 4 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 999 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977). (MacKinnon,
concurring), Compare U.S. v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); and
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appears, in other words, that under current decisional law, the employer's
duty of care does not extend beyond the duty to take corrective action after
having notice of a persistent problem.' 95 The employer's limited duty re-
garding harassment is highly reminiscent of the employer's limited duty to
provide suitable fellow servants and promulgate and enforce work rules. It is
also reminiscent of the fellow servant rule under which employees are
deemed to have assumed the risk of negligence by their co-workers. Indeed,
the duty to prevent harassment may be even more limited, since complaints as
to prior acts may he the only way to show that the incident at issue was
foreseeable.' 96
Given these parallels between the common law of employer liability and
current interpretations of the anti-discrimination laws, developments in the
area of employer liability for discrimination in the work environment may
mirror the slow progress of decisional law in the area of industrial accidents.
prior to statutory change. The duty not to discriminate may come to be
considered non-delegable,'" or, based on the power they exert over the
worker's life, certain employees may he considered "vice-principals" and thus
become exempt from the fellow servant rule.'" Similarly, certain
situations—such as the introduction of a small number of female or minority
workers into a traditionally male or white job—may come to be seen as posing
a foreseeable risk of harassment, which the employer reasonably could be ex-
pected to take steps to prevent.'""
As understanding grows concerning the phenomena of harassment and
job stress in general, and class-based harassment in particular, however', it is
possible that anti-discrimination statutes will be seen as a fitting analogue to
workers' compensation laws. Two facets of harassment are particularly rele-
vant CO making this possibility of strict liability a reality. One is understanding
the important relation sexual harassment bears to mental health, physical
health, and worker productivity. 211 The other is recognizing the way man-
agement can use harassment as a low -cost way of conveying status: the
privilege to harass is a benefit management can confer in lieu of salary or
other perquisites without obvious expenditure. 201 Just as strict liability is now
seen as an appropriate way of acknowledging and distributing the costs of
Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979) with Howard v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 388 F. Stipp. 683 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1975), and Bell v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio, F.D. 1976).
I"' 561 F.2d at I000.
See note 195 supra.
" 7 But see Judge MacKinnon's concurring opinion in Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 995-998. 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding no liability under common law prin-
ciples).
"4 " See PRossER, supra note 1 58. at 529.
I 99 nployment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor,
Women in Traditionally Male Jobs: The Experience of Ten Public Utility Companies 76 (R&D
Monograph No. 65) (1978). See also Brief Amid Curiae of the National Organization
For Women and Working Women's Institute at 35-37. Continental Can Co. v. State of
Minnesota. 49988, Minnesota Supreme Court.
200 See generally Bitouskv, supra note 140.
201 Id. at 6-7,
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industrial accidents, so too strict liability ultimately may be viewed an appro-
priate way of acknowledging and distributing the costs of discrimination.
B. Other Case Law
The thrust of the foregoing sections is that recognizing conduct moti-
vated by stereotypic role expectations as discriminatory behavior will assist in
identifying and eliminating significant barriers to equal employment oppor-
tunities. Thus it should lead to different results in certain cases where the
courts have failed to find discrimination under present concepts. For exam-
ple, stewardesses in all female classifications who have been forced to quit
under "no-marriage" or "quit-at-32" rules are unable to recover for lost
seniority and other injuries under a differential treatment standard; 212 yet
they have been adversely affected by stereotypic role requirements, i.e., that to
continue employment they must qualify as sexually available ornaments. Simi-
larly, rules prohibiting stewardesses from wearing eyeglasses—based no doubt
on the old saw that "men don't make passes at girls who wear glasses"—
should be held violative of Title VII even where there are no male flight
attendants.'"
Indeed weight and grooming standards in all work settings are suspect.
Although a full exploration of the questions raised by rules governing ap-
pearance is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note the roots of
such rules in stereotypic expectations of role appropriate behavior and the
part they play in reinforcing such expectations. The question of "who will
wear the pants"—in the house or the office—is of tremendous concern in
our society, and thus an employer rule prohibiting females from wearing
pantsuits in executive suites is not without significance. As one plaintiff has
said, such a prohibition "significantly affects employment opportunities be-
cause it perpetuates 'a sexist, chauvinistic attitude in employment' " particu-
larly where "the employer could offer no exuse whatsoever as to why his sec-
retary could perform a job in a more efficient. manner in a skirt rather than
in a pantsuit, and could only speculate as to whether or not. a skirt could be
considered more business-like." 2"4 While a rule of this sort arguably repre-
212 Loper v. American Airlines, 18 FEY Gas. 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978); EEOC
v. Delta Air lines Inc., 578 F.2d 115, 11(i (5th Cir. 1978): Stroud v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1977). In EEOC v. Delta, the Fifth Circuit, in dismiss-
ing the EFOG's argument that the no-marriage requirement preserved the stereotypi-
cal image of the single stewardess which the EEOC argued would not have been
forced upon a male if Delta employed mimic attendants. found that Delta's policy of
excluding males "eliminates the possibility of establishing discrimination against.
females in the resulting all—female job category. - EEOC v. Delta, 578 F.2d at 116.
293 La/fey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Gin 1976) (differen-
tial application of grooming standards cognizable as Title VII violation). This case
would seem to preclude any argument for a no-eyeglass requirement based on safety
since male flight attendants were allowed to wear eyeglasses uncler Northwest's rule.
Id. at 454, n.170.
2 " Lanigan v. Barden & Grain, 19 FEY Gas. 1039, 1041 (WI). Mo. 1979) (plain-
tiff failed to demonstrate ''how defendant's dress code policies impermissibly restrict
equal employment opportunities ... her contention that policies perpetuate a
stereotype is simply a matter of opinion."
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sents a company decision to project a cerain image, not all images are permis-
sible. A company presumably would not he permitted to post. posters
throughout its premises advertising itself as dedicated to the suppression of
blacks, nor would it be able to require all Negro employees to wear blackface.
The problem is thus one of recognizing how potent and how detrimental are
the messages conveyed, a matter perhaps best handled on a case-by-case
basis. 205 An ad hoc approach, however, will only succeed in eliminating sex
based barriers to equal employment opportunity if judicial concepts of
discriminatory behavior are expanded.
This additional concept of discrimination should also help explain several
decisions that have identified individual instances of discriminatory conduct
without fully articulating a satisfactory theoretical basis for doing so. Perhaps
the paradigm case is the "uppity" black. The limited case law in this area
suggests that adverse job actions directed at blacks because they are "uppity"
are discriminatory whether or not black or white co-workers suffer similar
adverse treatment. For example, the Supreme Court suggested in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green"" that a company's adverse reactions to civil rights activism
by an employee are proof of discriminatory intent. 207 The Court did not
explain why race-related activism could not be the basis of retaliatie.m, while
other types of activism presumably could be. The explanation cannot lie en-
tirely in the protection against retaliation offered by § 704(a) of Title VII, for
where the employee claims to oppoSe discriminatory practices without actually
participating in some aspect of a Title VII proceeding the employee is pro-
tected at most against retaliation for activity in opposition to an employment
practice reasonably believed to violate Title VII. 208 Generalized civil rights
activism thus does not seem to qualify as such protected activity.
"' See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 274 (1976) and compare with Annot., 89
A.L.R. 3d 7 (1979). For a particularly insightful analysis of the problems presented by
appearance rules, see MACKINNON, supra note 86, at Appendix A.
2 " 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2"7 The suggestion came in the Court's discussion of how pretextuality could be
shown. The Supreme Court specifically stated that proof of prior adverse reactions
would he relevant evidence of the pretextuality of the company's proffered justifica-
tion for later firing the plaintiff. 411 U.S. at 804. On remand, the district court found
that the plaintiff failed to show pretextuality in view of evidence that the employer had
never reprimanded the plaintiff for his extensive civil rights activity prior to his lay-off
and that the proportion of non-whites hired had increased substantially since the lay-
off. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 390 F. Stipp. 501, 503 (E.D. Mo.. E.D.
1975). lit affirming, the circuit court dismissed the argument that the failure to disci-
pline workers involved in non-racial strikes showed discrimination because the workers
had bargained for a no-discipline clause 528 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1976).
208 Sias v. City of Demonstration Agency, 18 FEP Cas. 981, 982-83 (9th Cir.
1978); Compare Sias, supra, and Hearth v. Metropolitan Trans. Comm'n, 436 F. Stipp.
685, 688-89 (D. Minn. 1977) (when an employee reasonably believes that discrimina-
tion exists, opposition thereto is opposition to an employment practice made unlawful
by Title VII even if the employee turns out to he mistaken as to the facts) with Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969) (protection from retalia-
tion under the participation clause of Title VII is totally independent of merit of the
Title VII charge). See also B. Schlei & P. Grossman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
428-429 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
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Speaking most directly to the problem of the "uppity black" is an EEOC
decision holding, in conclusory terms, that it is unlawful for an employer to
discharge a black worker because his manner was self-confident rather than
submissive. 2 °' While a finding. of discrimination in such cases could be
explained by attributing the adverse actions to racial animus, in the traditional
sense, such an explanation is far from satisfying. The wrong to he corrected is
not an evil mental state, but the effect of reinforcing in both the employer
and the employee the notion that "shuffling" is proper behavior 'for black
people. 210
Closely related to the "uppity black" cases are the "afro" hairstyles and
facial hair cases. In one such case a court found that the firing of a black
teacher who refused to remove his goatee was tainted with institutional ra-
cism, "the effects of which [were] manifested in an intolerance of ethnic diver-
sity and racial pride. "211 Likewise, EEOC decisions have considered stan-
dards prohibiting such styles discriminatory on racial grounds because such
styles are disproportionately prevalent among blacks, and because they are
seen as an expression of "heritage, culture, and racial pride. "212 In a pro-
cedural context, the Seventh Circuit simply held analogously that an allegation
that an employee was fired because she could not represent her employer
"with [her] Afro" constituted a clear charge of racial discrimination. Stating
that la] lay person's description of racial discrimination could hardly be more
explicit," 213 the court saw no need to explain why such a description was le-
gally sufficient.
It might be possible to rationalize these cases in terms of evil motive, or,
in the case of company rules, disparate impact. The operative factor, however,
is the persecution of expressions of racial pride, whether or not hostility to
2 " 1968-1973 CCH EEOC DEC. 11 6087 (1969). See also EEOC I)Ec. No. 71-
1677, 3 FEP Gas. 1242 (April 12, 1971) (violation where supervisor called black female
"trouble-maker" and one of those "civil righters"). Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966) cert. denied sub nom, Branch v. Johnson, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967)
(renewal of black teacher's contract cannot constitutionally be conditioned on forego-
ing civil rights activities which do not interfere with teaching duties).
215 That we are more likely to recognize racial hostility in the desire to keep
blacks acting submissive, but not in the desire to keep women from wearing pants
reflects the fact that the cultural assumptions which support stereotypic thought and
behavior are more widely shared in regard to women than in regard to blacks.
2" Braxton V. Board of Puhlic Instruction of Duval County. Fla.. 303 F. Supp.
958. 959-960 (M l). Fla. 1969).
212 EEOC DrcisioNs No. 72-0979 (1972); CCH LEW.: DrcisioNs 11 6343:
EEOC DEctstoNs 72-1380 (1972), EEOC DECISIONS 1I  But see Smith v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. 186 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1973) and Thomas v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Go. 392 F. Stipp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975) upholding neutral rules applied equally.
213 Jenkins v. Blue Cross Jut. Hosp. Ins.. Inc.. 538 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied. 429 U.S. 986 (1976). Those decisions are particularly interesting in view of
the Supreme Court's holding in Kelley v. Johnson, 125 U.S. 238 (1976) allowing police
departments to regulate the hair style of police officers consistent with due process,
and in view of the almost uniform lower court decisions upholding grooming stan-
dards against Title VII challenges in the absence of unequal enforcement. Perhaps the
failure to articulate a satisfactory basis for the racial discrimination decisions has lim-
ited their impact in these other areas.
390	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:345
that pride consciously motivates the employer. The evil in the employment
practice is the imposition on blacks of a certain image and mode of behavior.
A decision to pass over an assertive woman in favor of one who conforms
more closely to the traditional female stereotype in allocating promotions simi-
larly reinforces dysfunctional socialization. In the absence of a clearly articu-
lated theory of employment discrimination addressed to the artificial barriers
created by this role reinforcement, however, one court faced with this prob-
lem apparently concluded that it had to find the employer's conduct moti-
vated by "an antipathy to women" before it could make a finding of sex dis-
crimination. 214
Just as this court strained to fit the assertive woman case into the evil
motive formulation, other courts strain to deal with other stereotypes as in-
stances of unequal treatment. Another district court, for example, utilized a
hypothetical male in dealing with a terminated black woman's allegations "that
her supervisor told her she probably didn't need a job anyway, because her
husband was a Caucasian." 215 Noting that the statement logically could not
be made to a male and thus the statement "that the dismissal might not [have]
occur[red] had the Plaintiff been a Negro male," the court found that the
statement "clearly smacks of sexual, as well as racial, discrimination.', 216 Whil e
it is certainly important to recognize that males are not often dismissed for
such reasons, it is more important to identify the harm done to females by
permitting an adverse personnel action to be based on the stereotypical view
that women, not men, are dependent on their spouses. A new concept of
discrimination could serve the function of acknowledging explicitly that ac-
tions based on such stereotypical views of women reinforce the attitudinal
barriers to equal employment that exist in the minds of both employer and
employee. 21
IV. TOWARD AN ADDITIONAL CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION
Previous sections of this article have argued that the goal of equal
employment opportunity is continually hindered by personnel actions that re-
flect and encourage particular role expectations for women. They have also
argued that the absence of a concept of discrimination specifically addressed
to such actions inhibits the development of a coherent body of antidiscrimina-
tion law that would effectively promote this goal. This section proposes that
the courts expand their understanding of Title VII by recognizing an addi-
tional mode or concept of discrimination. Under this concept, adverse
employment actions that can be attributed to class membership because they
are, at least in part, the product of stereotypic role expectations for that class
2 " Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Stipp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1976).
I" Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas. 409 F. Stipp. 1083, 1089 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (EEOC's failure to appreciate sexual implications of this sunement would
not bar plaintiff from proceeding on basis of sex as well as race discrimination).
216 1(1.
217 The Vuyanich court was clearly aware of the stereotype underlying the
statement: It is implicit in the statement that the male spouse is the more important
economically...." Id.
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should be recognized as unlawful under Title VII even in the absence of a
comparative standard. 218 This concept of discrimination—stereotyping as
discrimination per se—is first explored through two examples. Then it is
placed in the context of existing concepts of discrimination to show that it is a
logical evolution from these concepts entirely consistent with the goals of cur-
rent fair employment legislation. Finally, objections to the concept are consid-
ered.
A. Two Illustrations
Suppose a woman is denied a position involving overtime and weekend
work. Under existing concepts of discrimination, to establish a violation of the
fair employment laws she would ha've to show that the denial was due either
to animosity directed against her as a woman, to explicitly differential treat-
ment attributable to her sex, or to the application of neutral criteria having an
unnecessary disproportionate impact on her sex. In the absence of an identi-
fiable neutral criterion with disparate impact, she would most likely attempt to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination by satisfying the four-pronged
test set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: 2 " (1)
that she is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) that she was qualified;
(3) that she was rejected; and (4) that following her rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with her qual-
ifications. Should she succeed, the burden will then shift to the employer to
establish a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the denial. 220
Assume, further, that the employer explains his action by asserting that
the applicant had young children, and, therefore, could not possibly have
made the necessary time commitment. Here, a stereotypic 'view of woman's
primary commitment to her family enters as a justification for the disparate
treatment. Existing concepts of discrimination are of little help in determining
whether this reason is in fact non-discriminatory. Certainly if the woman lost
the job to a man who also had young children, she would be able to establish
a case of explicit disparate treatment. If, however, a man or a woman without
children"' was hired in her stead, or if the job remained unfilled, she can
point to no similarly situated person of the opposite sex who received better
treatment. In such circumstances, she might try to show that there were men
in other positions with children who the company had placed in sufficiently
comparable positions to demonstrate that she had in fact been subjected to
2 " 411 U.S. 792, 801. for an examination of the related argument that gov-
ernmental actions reflecting sex-role stereotypes warrant an inference of illicit motive
sufficient to establish a prima lade case of discrimination in the equal protection con-
text, see Frog. Securing job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers- ,
59 B.U.L. REV. 55. 82-90 (1977).
21 '' 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
221) Id. at 802.
221 This hypothetical addresses the situation where a position existed and was
withdrawn or where it has not yet. been filled. In both instances, a complainant may
seek to show that. the reason for her rejection was discriminatory Ivithout relying on
the McDonnell-Doug/a. formulation.
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differential treatment. This showing, however, nay be extremely difficult to
make, since the company can easily dispute the comparability of the positions.
Moreover, if the company was highly sex-segregated. it is unlikely that there
would be comparably situated men, even under a broad definition of compar-
ably situated. Indeed. the availability of' the defense that • two positions do not
involve comparable responsibilities gives the employer an incentive to increase
the sex segregation of its workforce.
The woman might also try to establish that the reason given for her de-
nial showed antipathy toward women or was a pretext. designed to conceal
such a discriminatory motive. But concern that child care responsibilities will
interfere with the woman's perfc.mnance is hardly likely to be considered a
pretext.. The concern also does not seem to manifest deliberate malevolence
toward women. A benevolent attitude toward women might be closer to the
mark, but benevolence denotes a conscious desire to help the individual,
which probably is not present in the type of decision at issue here. The reason
given for the decision seems to represent a genuinely-held, though
stereotypically-based, belief that the woman will not be able to meet the job's
requirements.
Finally, where the company has no explicit policy about working parents,
the complainant. may try to show that were some hypothetical man with young
children to have applied for the job, he would not have been rejected. This
"hypothetical man" approach has a certain plausibility in the sexual harass-
ment case where it is possible to inquire into the sexual orientation of the
pass-maker. In this context, however, it seems to amount to little more than
an amalgam of the inquiry into how somewhat comparably situated men were
treated, and whether the reason given bespeaks a stereotypical attitude toward
women, which is, therefore, not likely to be directed at men.
The proposed theory concentrates directly on that latter inquiry. Pur-
suant to this theory, the complainant would make out a case of discrimination
simply upon showing that the basis of her rejection was the stereotypic con-
ception that a woman's primary responsibility is to her family. By focusing
directly on the stereotypic nature of the rationale for the adverse decision,
this approach, unlike the more traditional approaches, highlights the evils in-
herent in the unconscious invocation of the stereotype—the preclusion of the
worker's own choice of proper behavior, and the reinforcement of her pri-
mary identity as mother in her own and her employer's eyes. In addition, the
focus on the intervention of an impermissible attitudinal bias avoids some po-
tentially troublesotne aspects of the McDonnell Douglas test. Because the
gravamen of her complaint is based on the intervention of a discriminatory
factor which resulted in the failure to accord her application proper consider-
ation, 222
 the woman should not have to establish her qualifications for the
position. 223
 Similarly, it should not be necessary for her to show that the
" 2 Cf: Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd., Co.. 	 479 17 .2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973) (in
differential treatment. context, failure to consider female application constitutes Tide
VII violation even though male hired was better qualified).
"3
 Dispute over qualifications is likely to be a central issue in individual dis-
et -intimation cases. See Blutnrosen„S'trangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to 'just
Cause" Protection Under Title VII. 2 !Nous. REL. L. j. 519, 521-36 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Strangers No Morel.
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employer continued to seek applicants following her rejection,'" or that a
member of the opposite sex was ultimately selected, as would be requited
under the traditional disparate treatment approach.
The defense may respond by disputing that the reason it gave was in fact
based on a stereotype about women. The court then would have to determine
whether the given rationale indeed reflected stereotypic expectations. 225 lf,
however, the employer should respond that the decision was in fact a neutral
rule, neither male nor female parents of young children were allowed such
positions, it then would seem that the defendant could dispel! the charge of
discrimination in the same way that an employer charged with denying blacks
special opportunities escapes liability by showing all workers were denied that
opportunity. 228
There is, however, the problem of assigning the burden of proving or
disproving the existence of such a neutral policy. 2" Normally, the plaintiff,
as the party seeking to change the status quo, bears the risk of non-
persuasion, but this is by no means universally true, particularly in the dis-
crimination context. 228 Ultimately, the allocation of particular burdens is a
question of policy' that can significantly enhance or hinder the enforcement
of a statute. 23" Here, it is apparent that requiring the defendant to carry the
burden of persuasion with regard to the neutrality vel non of its seemingly
stereotypical employment criteria will significantly further the remedial pur-
poses of fair employment legislation.
The advantage of placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant is
apparent in considering the difficulty a plaintiff would face in trying to sus-
tain the burden of showing non-neutrality. Through discovery, she might ob-
tain whatever records exist regarding the parental status of other applicants
for the position sought and other jobs with similar responsibilities, as well as
whatever documentation there is establishing an explicit company policy. But
it is highly unlikely that many records will exist correlating age of children
with specific job duties, particularly at the time an employee assumed the
Although a subsequent company reorganization or funding constraints may
cause a position to he withdrawn, the complainant's rejection may nevertheless have
been discriminatory.
For a discussion of the court's competence to perform this function, see leXt
accompanying notes 288-91	 318-24 infra.
221i See, e.g., Morita v..Southern Cal. Permanence Medical Group. 541 F.2(1 217,
218-20 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977) (failure to offer training to
minority employee to enable him to receive a promotion, absent showing that whites
were offered such training was held not to constitute disparate treatment.).
227 Since Title VII cases do not involve jtiry trials, rules allocating functions
between judge and jury arc irrelevant. Thus burden of proof here refers to the bur-
den of persuasion or risk of non-p2rsuasion. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVI
PRDCEDURE, 240-53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as JAMES & HAZARD].
228 111 a disparate impact case the defendant must show business necessity.
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Sec generally Strangers No More, supra note
223: Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153.
229 JAMES. & HAZARD, supra note 227, at 240-53.
233 See Pettit v. U.S., 488 F.2d 1026, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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duties."' Furthermore, so long as the hurden of proof remains on the plain-
tiff, the defendant. employer has an incentive to ensure that such records are
not kept. Yet the recordkeeping process is in and of itself important in achiev-
ing compliance with the fair employment laws since it means that lower level
decisionmakers must be aware of their own conduct, and that upper layers of
management are able to undertake their own reviews. To help ensure
adequate records are kept. then, it makes good sense to put the burden on
the defendant employer.
A second important reason for placing the burden on the employer in
this instance is the probability factor, that is, the extent to which a party's
contention "departs from what would be expected in light of ordinary human
experience." 232 Stereotypes frequently have a basis in fact. It is most often
the mother, even if she is a working mother, who has primary responsibility
for child care, and in light of that fact of life, it is to be expected that women,
not men, are considered unavailable to meet exceptional demands on their
time. Where an employer cannot show that such a consideration did not enter
into an employment decision, it seems reasonable to assume that in fact it did.
Certainly it is possible that there are employers that recognize the more active
role some men now take in the home, and consider it a basis for denying jobs.
But these particular employers, like others who extend stereotypic criteria of
one kind or another to the opposite sex, are surely the unusual ones. In these
circumstances it is not unfair to expect such employers to establish that they
are the exception by, for example, pointing to their personnel manuals or
other written documentation of their policies and practices.
Finally, if the defendant is to bear the burden of persuasion in showing
that what on its face appeared to be a stereotypically-motivated individual ad-
verse action was in fact the application of a neutral rule with neutral applica-
tion, the nature of proof necessary to meet that burden must be established.
Is it sufficient to produce any male who has been rejected for a responsible
position on the basis of family commitments, or does the notion of similar
situation require more precision? The issue is how similar the compared posi-
tions must be with respect to the need for the quality to which the challenged
rule relates. 233 There appears to be no reason to use a standard of similar
situation in the defensive context which differs from that currently in use in
the affirmative unequal treatment cases. Therefore, so long as a large degree
of similarity is required to sustain unequal treatment claims by women who
have worked in female-only jobs, that same degree of similarity should also be
necessary to make equal treatment defenses to claims of stereotyping per se.
But since at times it will be in the plaintiff's interest to show comparable
situation and at times it will be in the defendant's interest to make the same
showing, adding the proposed concept of discrimination may create some
pressure for a more accurate assessment of what work situations are truly
comparable with regard to the relevant characteristic.
231
 It is sometimes suggested that current liberal discovery rules diminish the
importance of the access to information factor in allocating burdens. See, e.g., McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. 1972).
232 JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 227, at 252.
233 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, Supra note 208, at 16 n.6.
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Suppose, for a second example, that two women are in competition for a
position involving public contact. One woman is considered too "aggressive,"
and the job is therefore given to the other, more "ladylike," one. 234 The
rejected applicant might attempt to show she had been subjected to disparate
standards by showing no male had ever been refused comparable employment
on these grounds. This showing might well be difficult to make, and if made,
might not be conclusive, since there is no guarantee that an aggressive man
had ever applied or been employed. But under the theory of discrimination
here presented, it is only necessary to show that women are expected to be
demure, not pushy, and that the first applicant was turned down for her
failure to conform to role expectations. As already noted, extensive psycholog-
ical research is available to substantiate such a claim.'" But, what if the
employer claims the first woman was truly offensive? Can "aggressiveness"
ever be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 'rejecting an applicant? In
evaluating this claim, it is important to recall the original justification for
focusing on stereotypic role expectations—to reward those who conform to
stereotypes and punish those who do not so conform--reinforces the validity
of the stereotypes for employer and worker, thereby defeating the goal of
equal employment opportunity. For this reason, every effort must be made to
avoid the articulation of stereotypic justifications for adverse actions. This can
be achieved, while at the same time accommodating legitimate business needs,
by requiring the employer to identify specific instances of unacceptable or
undesirable behavior in order to successfully rebut a discrimination claim.
The employer has a legitimate business interest in a smooth-running,
maximally productive operation. But in seeking to advance this interest by
basing personnel decisions on the conclusory attribution of stereotypic traits,
the employer may well be using means which are "fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation." 236 Sex bias may enter into a decision to reject an
applicant who is labelled "aggressive," for example, in two closely related
ways. First, the term "aggressive" may refer to conduct that is acceptable in
men, but not in women. As used in common parlance,'" "aggression" refers
to a variety of behaviors, only some of which are recognizable as detrimental
to a business operation. Thus it might be acceptable in terms of business
needs to reject a woman because she is aggressive in the sense that she injures
others, but to reject her because she is too energetic, bold or enterprising,
hardly appears justifiable in terms of business needs.'" Indeed, rejection on
2 " The example is drawn from Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C.
1976). It is not clear how often this fact pattern will occur in practice. A recent simula-
tion study by Florence Denmark suggests that abrasiveness even in women, is valued in
college teachers since it might make for exciting teaching. Denmark, The Outspoken
Woman: Can She Win, (unpublished paper presented at the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1979) [hereinafter cited as DENMARK].
235 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
22 ' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
237 As used by psychologists, the term has a far narrower meaning involving
the intent to harm others. See, e.g., E. MAccoBY & C. jActairc, THE PsvcnoLocv OF
SEX DIFFERENCES 227 (Paperback ed. 1978).
238
	
Collegiate Dictionary gives two senses of the word 'aggressive,"
one related to behavior tending to dominate or master, attack or injure, and the other
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these latter grounds is inure likely to reflect a view that the applicant's be-
havior was inappropriate for her sex. Second, the degree to which the appli-
cant is perceived to possess undesirable traits is likely to be affected by her
sex. If a woman performs certain acts, she may be taken as far more aggres .-
sive than a man performing the same acts. 2 ""
The sex bias inherent in subjective judgments of this kind is, however,
reduced when the employer is required to specify the actual behavior found
offensive and the way in which it would hinder the business operation. Such
specificity avoids confusion over the type of behavior in issue. Whether the
applicant was considered too hostile or too enterprising will become clear in
context. Specificity also helps reduce, if not eliminate, the problem of percep-
tual bias, 24"
 for it at least allows a rejected applicant to contest the employer's
version of an incident and the appropriateness of any judgments based on it.
Thus, for example, an employer concerned that the applicant's behavior will
interfere with the ability of her co-workers to perform or that it will cause
customers to go elsewhere, should identify a reasonable basis for such con-
cerns in the applicant's prior work history, conduct during the application
process, or other relevant experience. While employers are unlikely to record
their observations of potential employees with the precision of a trained ob-
server, and it is even more unlikely that courts will insist that they do so, it
does not seem too burdensome to ask the employer to specify particular inci-
dents as a basis for its judgment. Then, perhaps with the help of expert wit-
nesses, it should he possible to examine these incidents, first, to determine
whether they in fact occurred, and second, to ascertain whether they can be
fairly characterized as interfering with the needs of the employer's busi-
ness. 241
"marked by driving forceful energy.-
 WERsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE_ DicTioNAtty 23
(1974) while THE AMERICAN HERITAGE	 rIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE at 25
(1969) defines it as - I. Inclined to move or act in a hostile fashion. 2. Assertive. hold
enterprising. -
2"
 See DENMARK. Siipia note 234. Denmark's study not only Kippur's the view
that being outspoken is perceived as a node trait and being conciliatory is perceived as
a female trait, bin it also confirms the general tendency for women to he rated less
favorably than (heir male counterparts: "When la woman] displays socially desirable
feminine traits. she may be perceived as having less of them than a man who displays
such traits. When she displays stereotypical masculine traits, she is rated as having
more of the undesirable ones than a man who displays them.'' Id. at 19-20. Denmark's
study also suggests that the sex of the rater may influence the influence the judgment.
with women scoring other women much more harshly for behavior considered inap-
propriate to the female role. This latter point is relevant in the employment context
only when women are in positions which involve the authority to rate other woman.
See also text accompanying notes 43 & 52, supra.
240 Perhaps the only way to eliminate such bias entirely is by using a sex-blind
evaluation system which is usually impossible.
"' In recent years. certain psychologists have put particular emphasis on dis-
tinguishing aggressive behavior, which in negatively valued, from assertive behavior.
which is positively valued. See, e.g., R. ALBERTI M. •MMONS, YOUR PERFECT RIGHTS
21-47 (1970). A. LANGE & P. JAKunowsKi, RES PONS BLE ASSERTIVE: 13EiAVtOR 7-1 1
(1976). Assertion, it is said, involves "standing rip for personal rights and expressing
thoughts. feelings, and beliefs in direct, hottest, and appropriate ways which do not vio-
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The principle that specificity is necessary to minimize bias in areas involv-
ing subjective judgments is certainly not new to equal opportunity law:242
Subjective evaluations must be validated as job-related, 243 un iform, 244 and
embodied in written instructions and guidelines:245 To require an employer
to root its adverse decision in detailed judgments regarding the rejected can-
didate's past functioning is an appropriate response to the recognition that
"[to permit] upgrading that depends upon the employer's subjective opinion
concerning various traits is ... to subject the promotion to the intolerable
occurrence of conscious or unconscious prejudice.' "2"
B. The Context
This section argues that although the concept of stereotyping per se does
not fit comfortably within any of the definitions recognized in discrimination
law to date, it is entirely consistent with the understood goals of fair employ-
ment legislation and the dynamic of its interpretation. As already noted, civil
rights legislation has been characterized by three successive concepts of dis-
crimination. 247 Initially, discrimination was defined in terms of evil motive,
which traditionally required a showing that the respondent was motivated by
dislike or hatred of the group to which the complainant belonged. Sub-
sequently, a second, comparative standard evolved under which it is necessary
to show explicit unequal treatment. The Supreme Court recently has indi-
late another person's rights,- UL at 7. while aggression involves harm to others. Id. at.
10; ALBERT] & Erounas, supra at 24. In distinguishing the two types of behavior,
psychologists look to both verbal and non-verbal components, which might include
duration of looking at the other person, duration of speech. loudness and affect in
speech. See LANGE & JAKUBOWSKI, .supra at 10, citing Eisler, Miller & Hersen, Compo-
nents of Assertive Behavior, 29 J. CLAN. PSYCH. 295 (1973). Aggressive behavior, for
example, is said to include eye contact that tries to stare down the other person, a
strident voice that does not fit the situation, sarcastic or condescending tone of voice,
and parental body gestures such as finger pointing. Id. at 11.
2" A useful summary of the pertinent decisions appears in Ste. Marie v. East-
ern R.R. Ass'ir., 458 F. Stipp. 1147, 1162 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). See also ScuLi.:t
GROSSMAN, supra note 208. at 166-181.
243 Rogers v. Internatiimal Paper Co., 510 F.2(.1 1340 (8th Cir. 1975). vacated on
other grounds, 423 U.S. 804, traidified, 526 F.2d 722 (8111 Cir. 1975).
244 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 232 n.47 (5th Cir.
1974).
2-1 	atnes v. Stockham Valves and Fitting Co.. 559 F.2d 310, 328 (5th Cir.
1977), cert denied. 434 U.S. 1034 (1978): Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159.
1193 (5th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) quoting Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
2" Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n.. 458 F. Stipp. 1147, 1162 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
quoting Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.. 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1976), modified.
544 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
247 This presentation is derived from Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153, at
67-69. Arguably. only two modes of discrimination have been recognized: one
grounded in impermissible motive; the other in impermissible effect. Under this for-
mulation, the first two concepts identified in the text are collapsed into one. For
reasons discussed below. I believe Professor Blumrosen's tripartite classification is stilt
viable.
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cated that discriminatory motive is still involved in the unequal treatment case,
but that the impermissible motive may be inferred once disparate treatment is
shown. 248
 would seem nevertheless that there is a difference between the
initial concept of evil motive and the latter concept of unequal treatment. In
the first case, the discriminatory intent is animus or hostility, an intent to do
harm; it has as its common law parallel civil cases involving malice or willful
and wanton misconduct and the criminal requirement of mens rea. 24 " At issue
in the second case is an intent to treat a person differently because of that
person's membership in a disfavored group; 250
 here the mental state corres-
ponds to negligence in tort."' Under the first concept, the individual is pro-
tected against deliberate denials of employment opportunity on the basis of
class prejudice; under the second, the individual is protected against being
subjected to unjustified differences in treatment.'"
With the Griggs decision, 253
 a third, neutrally-based, concept of discrimi-
nation was recognized. Under this formulation, the necessity of showing both
intent and explicit differences in treatment between two compared groups is
248 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), the Supreme Court stated:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understocid type of discrimina-
tion. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of race, color. religion, sex or national origin. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Id. at 335-36 n.15.
'" See Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153, at 67-69. Although the possibility
cif prejudice for as well as prejudice against is acknowledged in the literature, this
original concern of the law was with negative prejudice which leads to economic harm.
For a development of a definition of the term "prejudice," see ALLPORT, supra note 69,
at 6-9, using as a preliminary definition of prejudice:
an aversive or ho s tile attitude toward a person who belongs to that group
... and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed
to that group. Id. at 7.
And finally as the definition:
Ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible
generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a
group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that
group. Id. at 9.
251i CI. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney. 422 U.S. 256, 99 S. C:t.
2282 (1979):
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision-maker, in
this case a stale legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least, in part "because" of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group. (cites omitted).
Id. at 99 S. Ct. 2296.
25 ' Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153, at 67-69.
252
 Under this view the Supreme Court's language in Teamsters, suggesting that
not all cases of disparate treatment constitute discrimination, refers to cases where the
inequality is justified. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
2 " Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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eliminated; instead it is sufficient to show that purported neutral and equal
treatment in fact adversely affects greater numbers of a protected group than
of other groups.
A dose look at these concepts reveals the difficulties that arise in accom-
modating fact patterns involving adverse actions based on stereotypes. Taking
these concepts in reverse order, the Griggs concept of discrimination involving
neutral practices with disparate impacts, would seem to be of little utility in
this endeavor. The concept has been recognized as explosive precisely because
of the broad, systemic attacks it permits. 254 Yet this very benefit makes its
analysis unavailable in cases involving conduct directed at an individual. More
importantly, where the essence of the conduct at issue is its grounding in
'stereotypic expectation, the disregard of motivation that distinguishes this
third concept from other concepts of discrimination would seem to prevent its
direct application to the cases under consideration.
The disparate or unequal treatment model seems far more promising. As
already noted, the problem with this approach in many instances where
women have been subjected to stereotypic expectations is the lack of a simi-
larly situated male who received different, more favorable treatment. This
lack of a comparative standard can be expected to occur most commonly in
sex segregated occupations, and in companies inclined toward tokenism that
pit women against each other for limited openings; but it could arise in any
employment situation. As already noted, a woman with children who loses a
position requiring overtime or travel to a woman without children or even to
a man without children has no similarly situated male competitor. Yet an
employment decision adverse to her may have been based on the role expec-
tation that as a woman with domestic obligations, she was not free to work
overtime or to travel.
Two ways of approaching this problem under the disparate treatment
standard have already been sugggested. First, a complainant may attempt to
expand the notion of comparable situation. While early decisions would sup-
port this approach at least implicitly, 255 more recent cases have cast some
doubt on its viability. 256 The realities of the employment world may impose
even more fundamental limits on this approach. Not only may some jobs
genuinely he unique, but in highly sex-segregated establishments, the few
male employees often occupy totally dissimilar positions from the majority of
female employees. The waitress who is fired when she gets too old to be con-
sidered alluring, for instance, is hard put to compare her treatment to that
So, for example. Griggs has been applied to invalidate height and weight
requirements. arrest and conviction records prohibitions and garnishments and other
financial criteria. See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 208, at 132-65, 254-55,
But see New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, U.S. (1978) (upholding policy of
refusing to employ persons who use methodone).
Sprogis v. United Air Lines. Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (197 I); Lansdale v. Airline Pilots Ass'n., 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cit. 1970); Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 844 (1977); EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978).
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accorded the restaurant manager. And as already noted, attempts to expand
the concept of disparate treatment in this fashion give the employer a further
incentive to segregate its workforce.
The second approach using a disparate treatment analysis involves the
development of a hypothetical similarly-situated male. One would argue that.
had a male been employed in a similar position, he would not have been
subjected to the same offensive treatment. This tack is available at least in
theory under the British Sex Discrimination Act, 257
 and has some support in
Title VII case law. As noted above, in the sexual harassment case where the
complainant-victim has no male co-workers it may suffice to show that the
haras'sing supervisor was heterosexual, and therefore would not have
bothered a male subordinate if there had been one. 258
 Similarly, in Skelton v.
Balzano 25"
 where the supervisor's preference for a non-assertive woman over
an assertive woman was held to reflect an impermissible antipathy toward
women, the court stated: "[i]t is enough to show ... that if plaintiff had been
a man she would not have been treated in the same manner."'"
While it would seem that the courts are perfectly capable of employing
such a "hypothetical person" construct, 2 " the approach does not seem totally
satisfactory. Except in the case of the heterosexual supervisor who harasses a
female subordinate, but. who would not bother a hypothetical male subordi-
nate, it is difficult to imagine how a court would go about determining the
hypothetical treatment that might be accorded this fictional person. More
likely than not, a court would employ sex-based stereotypes about the
hypothetical person. If this is so, it would seem far simpler to focus directly
on the stereotypic treatment of the actual female and to acknowledge in
straight-fin-ward fashion that the statutory violation consists of grounding an
adverse decision in stereotypic role expectations.
The fact patterns of cases turning on stereotypic expectations often seem
closest to those traditionally decided under the original concept of discrimina-
tion as evil motivation. But in stereotypic expectation cases, the behavior at
issue may not be a product of conscious animus. This fact points up the illogic
in distinguishing between adverse consequences flowing from subjectively
malevolent class-based motives, and adverse consequences flowing from sub-
jectively benign motives. It seems no more acceptable, for example, for a
woman to be denied a job in the construction trades because the contractor
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975. c. 65.
2 " Section 1[1] [a] of the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, defines discrimination
to include cases when a person is treated "less favorably than a person of the other sex
is or 01001d be treated. -
 However, it is said to be cid' ficult to prove a hypothetical claim in
practice. See Retitle!, Legislating [or Equal Pay and Opportunity for Women in Britain, 3
SIGNS 897, 901 (1978).
222 429 F. Stipp. 1231 (D.1).C. 1976).
" Id. at 1235.
2 " The device won Id seem to be precluded in cases where the job classification
is sex-specific and there is therefore no possibility of a hypothetical man being hired.
See, e.g.. Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.. 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
844 (1977).
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wants to save her from the physically taxing work involved than for her to be
denied the same job because the contractor doesn't like women, or at least
working with them. In both cases, the employer deliberately imposes an ad-
verse result because of the applicant's gender.
The precise mental state underlying intentional acts is often hard to pin-
point, and for this reason alone it seems wrong to give legal significance to
distinctions among class-based motivations. 212 But even assuming that an act
based on a class-based attraction could be differentiated from one stemming
from a class-based aversion, both categories nevertheless should be recognized
as discriminatory, for the essence of discrimination is the substitution of an
irrelevant and immutable class characteristic for individualized judgment."'
This is particularly true with regard to women, who have traditionally been
deprived of opportunites by virtue of paternalistic stereotyping that is too
often perceived as benign.
The original notion of evil motive discrimination must be expanded in
one other dimension to eliminate the obstacles to equal employment oppor-
tunity posed by stereotyping. Adverse employment decisions based on
stereotypes interfere with two interests: (1) the individual's interest in not suf-
fering economic harm from her failure to conform to stereotypical role expec-
tations, and (2) society's interest in overcoming mutually reinforcing role ex-
pectations that promote occupational segregation. Prohibiting the economic
harm deliberately imposed because of membership in a protected class is not
sufficient to protect these interests. Apart from whether the motivation is be-
nevolent or malevolent, it is rare that decision-makers will be conscious of
their class bias. Decision-makers may perceive their actions if they acknowl-
edge them at all, to be directed at a particular individual and based on a
reaction to the person as an individual. A common example is the case of the
assertive woman who is judged to be too abrasive. Alternatively, decision-
makers may actually articulate a rationale, based on a stereotype but simply
not recognize the nature of that rationale, as in the case of the mother who is
not considered free to travel. Finally, decision-makers may not articulate any
rationale at all, but the class-based motivation may still be apparent from the
circumstances. This would be the case where a woman is fired when her only
transgression was continually wearing pantsuits to work.
Given the detrimental impact of the conduct in each of these cases, there
seems to be little reason to distinguish conscious class bias from unconscious
class bias. Rather than insisting on the presence of a mental state akin to fault,
it would seem more constructive to provide an incentive to identify and elimi-
nate counter-productive class-based behavior without seeking to attribute
2 " 2 See ALLPORT, supra note 69. at 17-28.
2"3 See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws. 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 243-44
(1971): [hereinafter cited as F ► ss]. According to Owen Fiss. equal treatment embodies
two principles: (I) using (in his case) race as a criterion violates the principle that one
should he judged by criteria over which one has some control: and (2) the merit prin-
ciple, i.e., that one should be judged by a criterion which can predict productivity with
some accuracy. Id. at 240-44. See also Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Halm L. Rev. 1, 6-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BREsT].
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blame. In this sense, our definition of individual discrimination should be in-
formed by a more sophisticated understanding of the barriers to equal
employment opportunity. Just as neutral rules having an unnecessary dispar-
ate impact are recognized as violative of Title VII without regard to the
employer's intent, so too individual adverse actions attributed to class-
membership should be recognized as violative irrespective of the employer's
intent. 264
In SUM, to fit the case of stereotyping per se, the original concept of dis-
crimination as adverse acts motivated by class-based animus must be expanded
to include benevolent, as well as malevolent, acts, and unconscious, as well as
conscious, acts. Once this is done, the question arises whether there is any
benefit to be gained by explicitly differentiating this expanded version from
the original concept of discrimination. It would seem on balance that separate
recogniton of stereotyping per se as a fourth concept of discrimination is pref-
erable, for it focuses attention on, and thereby increases awareness of an im-
portant mechanism by which equal employment opportunity is denied. If we
become aware of such a mechanism, we are far more likely to take it seriously.
Once the evocation of stereotypes is seen as an obstacle to qualified workers
being given opportunities, and as an obstacle to their optimal performance,
certain conduct that is now perceived as trivial (such as sexual harassment)
may be understood as truly harmful. Additionally, many day-to-day interac-
tions among employees may be recognized both as discriminatory and
employment-related; discriminatory because they serve to confine traditionally
disadvantaged groups to their stereotypic roles, and employment-related be-
cause they often result from and'serve to maintain segregated workforces. For
these reasons, an explicit recognition of this new concept of discrimination
2 " The concept then combines disadvantageous consequence or effect with a
broadly defined mental element. The proposed standard thus resembles but is differ-
ent from an innovative test proposed for housing discrimination cases under § 1982.
See Brown, Givelber & Subrin. Treating Blacks as f They Were White: Problems of Defini-
tion and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. Rev. 1 (1975). That test contains two
elements: (1) disadvantageous treatment of a non-white as compared to "treatment of
similarly situated whites by the defendant or by others engaging in transactions similar
to the defendant's" which is (2) "for a reason attributable to race." Id. at 18-19.
As used in the § 1982 test, reasons attributable to race include a personal
reaction—consciously hostile or otherwise—based on race as well as a policy which has
a greater adverse impact on blacks than whites because it is a product of, or reflects
the long history of discrimination against nun-whites, or because that history has left
blacks more vulnerable than whites when there is no "business necessity" for such
policies. Id. at 21. The § 1982 test is narrower than that proposed here in that it calls
for a showing of comparative disadvantage, at least with respect to treatment of simi-
larly situated whites by others. The test proposed .here is designed to deal with cases
where a convincing showing of this sort is unlikely clue to the structure of the job
market and/or the nature of the conduct complained of.
The proposed § 1982 test is also broader than the one proposed here in that it
appears to reach the Griggs situation involving neutral policies with a disparate impact.
To the extent that stereotypic expectations are determined by historical discrimination,
e.g., the legal and social inability of women to make their way except as sexual
partners, the notion here proposed includes the "historical product" as well as the




may appropriately lead to a general extension of employer liability under
anti-discrimination laws, akin to that discussed in the section on sexual
harassment.
The recognition of this additional mode of discrimination is consistent.
with the statutory scheme of Tide VII—both its language and its broad pur-
pose, as well as the evolutionary process the concept of discrimination has
undergone thus far. A glance at Title VII reveals that Congress avoided pro-
viding any definitive definition of discrimination. 265 Indeed it has been
suggested that leaving the definition of discrimination to the evolinionary
process of litigation was "[p]erhaps one of the wisest decisons made by Con-
gress in 1964." 266 This transmission of responsibility to the judicial branch
was achieved by simply making it unlawful to discriminate" against members
of the protected classes."' The statutory language is, however, significant.
In omitting the term "discriminate" entirely from a second key operative pro-
vision, and instead focusing on the phrase "adverse effect," the statute does
suggest an emphasis on consequences rather than on state of mind.'"
The courts consequently have engaged in a dynamic process of statutory
interpretation. Rather than a literal reading of statutory provisions, 2"" the es-
sence of this process seems to be a quest for a body of legal principles that
can deal effectively with continuing occupational inequalities in a manner con-
205 The Congressional failure to define discrimination has been specifically
noted by the Supreme Court. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133
(1976). However, the language in Gilbert suggesting that. the concept. of discrimination
under Title VII is limited to that of the 14th Amendment is of dubious vitality in view
of the Court's pre-Gilbert decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and
post-Gilbert decisions in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) and Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
2 "" Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII since 1965: Implications of the
New Law, 30 RuTo. L. RE.v. 1, 5 n. 19 (1976).
267 Section 703(a)(2) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer-
... (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely , affect his status
as an employee, because of" such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. V 1975). As Professor Blumrosen points
out, this provision was not part of the New York fair employment law on which Title
VII was modeled, and it thus provides a new point of departure for statutory interpre-
tation. Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153, at 74.
21 " It has been suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136, 144 (1977) that intent may be required in a § 703(a)(1) case, though not in a
703(a)(2) case. However both Justice Powell and Justice Stevens disputed this sugges-
tion in their respective concurring opinions. See 434 U.S. at 152-53 n.6 (Powell J.,
concurring) and 434 U.S. at 154 11.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
2" See, e.g., United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, (1979)
(argument of white worker that all race-conscious affirmative action plans are prohi-
bited by Title VII "resaing] upon a literal interpretation of §§ 703(a) and (d) ... not
without force:" nevertheless voluntary plan upheld in light of overriding statutory
purpose to open opportunities for blacks in occupations which had traditionally been
closed to them).
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sistent with this country's values:27 " The starting point of this quest must be
the articulation of the statute's goal. At present, this must be seen at a
minimum as a commitment to equality of opportunity."' In the now famous
words of the Supreme Court:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment. opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past 10 favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. 272
As currently understood,"" the statute is a guarantee of fair treatment for
individuals; that is, a guarantee that individuals will be evaluated according to
their own characteristics or merit in relation to relevant neutral criteria, 274
even if they belong to a class that, as a generality, does not satisfy the
criteria. 275 This guarantee is tempered by a tolerance for private efforts to
27" A critique of these values as articulated by the Court is well beyond the
scope of this article. For a critical analysis of their failure to meet the needs of blacks
in the United States, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. Rev. 1049 (1978)
and of women in the United States, see Passers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Direc-
tions of Sex Discrimin.ation Law, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pow-
ERS J.
Equality of opportunity must be distinguished •roin a more result-oriented
goal of equality of achievement, see Fiss, supra note 263, at 237-49, or of equality of
participation, see POWERS, supra note 270, at 102-22. Such goals carry with them, in
Fiss' phrase, "mediating principles" which differ from the anti-discri ► ination princi-
ples described here. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pus,
AFFAIRS 107 (1976) proposing a "group disadvantaging" principle which abandons the
focus on the relation between classifications and ends to be achieved in favor of a
focus on the extent to which a practice disadvantaging blacks is justified: dAcKINNoN,
supra note 86, proposing a similar approach for women which she terms "the in-
equalities approach;" and Powrxs, supra note 270, proposing an analysis focusing on
the tendency of practices to exclude women from full participation in society. For a
discussion of the reasons for choosing between these goals, see these sources and
BREST, supra note 263.
272 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U,S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
273
 See note 271 supra.
274 The important question of' when criteria are truly neutral is also beyond the
scope of this article. Commentators are increasingly calling into question the neutrality
of criteria which have been 6u -ululated by white men or on the basis of a white male
standard. See, e.g., POWERS, supra note 270, at 88-99: MAcKINNON. SUpra note 86, at
126- 127. The problem is graphically posed by the neutrality yet non of a height re-
quirement for pilots which is necessary to ensure that pilots can see and reach the
instruments in airplanes built to the specifications of the average white male. See Boyd
v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 13 FEP Cas. 529 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (airline ordered to lower
height requirement from 5'7" to 5'5").
275 See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978):
• The statute makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions. or privileges of employ-
me ► t, because of such individual's race, color, religion. sex, or national ori-
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overcome historic disadvantagement, so long as those efforts do not exceed as
yet undefined bounds.""
As such, the statute's mandate is to identify and eliminate practices that
interfere with the fair evaluation of individual capability, particularly as they
serve to exclude disadvantaged groups from the full range of employment
opportunities. And, although "disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it. enacted Title VII,'" the definition of dis-
crimination by necessity has evolved beyond this concept.
Recognition of the proposed fourth concept of discrimination is a logical
continuation of the evolutionary process by which civil rights law has defined
discrimination to date. The process has had both a procedural and a substan-
tive component. Procedurally, there has always been a concern that the legal
test articulated be practicable. A major motivating factor behind the move
away from the initial focus on the state-of-mind test, for example, was the
morass of proof problems created by the test. The equal protection approach
gin." ...The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It. precludes
treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual,
or national class. If height. is required for a job, a tall woman inay not be
refused employment merely because, on the average, women are too short.
Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for dis-
qualifying an individual to whoun the generalization does not apply.
Id. at 708 (emphasis added by the Court).
' 71' United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721.
2730 (1979). "We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action ...." According to Justice Blackmun,
the Weber majority would permit race-conscious affirmative action plans whenever the
job category in question is "traditionally segregated." 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2732 (1979)
(Blackmun, J. concurring). In upholding Kaiser's plan. the Court pointed to the fact
that the plan is a temporary measure and that there is no absolute preference for
blacks.
The extent to which such benign purposes will permit individually inaccurate
class-based generalization is also not clear. Apparently, there is no need to show that
the blacks now benefiffing from the race-conscious program are those previously
excluded from the occupations at issue. Compare Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (split decision invalidating University's special admis-
sions program at Davis Campus Medical School which set aside 16 out of 100 places
for ethnic minorities; opinion of four judges based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964; one judge's opinion based on the Fourteenth Amendment: four judges voting
to uphold the program on both grounds). in Bakke, justice Powell (who did not sit in
the Weber case) would seem to require total precision both as a statutory and constitu-
tional matter when racial classifications are used to redress past discrimination, 438
U.S. at 31)2-03: he is far more tolerant of gender classifications based on individually
inaccurate generalizations. 438 U.S. at 303. Arguably, such tolerance is more harmful
in the case of gender classifications than in the case of racial classifications. The views
of Justice Powell notwithstanding, the "romantic paternalism" which has characterized
sex discrimination 'nay make it harder to differentiate the benign from the harmful in
the sex case, and may lead inure readily 10 a perpetuation of common stereotypes
about women. See Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida statute awarding lim-
ited property tax exemption to widows and the handicapped is constitutional as means
of redressing past discrimination).
277 I nternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n. 15 (1977).
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thus evolved to permit an inference of evil motive from a showing of unequal
treatment. Similarly, this concern for a workable test has led to an easing of
the requirements necessary to make out a prima facie case of discrimination,
which shifts the burden of production to the defendants—who after all have
control of the pertinent information—in both systemic and individual claims
of discrimination. 278
Throughout the evolutionary process, however, there has been a substan-
tive counterpart to such procedural concerns. Substantively, the concern for
effective enforcement has meant a shift from a preoccupation with state-of'-
mind to a focus on consequences. in adopting the disparate impact concept of
discrimination, the Griggs Court responded favorably to the argument for an
objective standard articulated by Cooper and Sobol in 1969:
This shift away from a restrictive, focus on the state of mind of the
employer is essential to the effective enforcement of fair employ-
ment laws, not merely because specific intent is difficult to prove, but
because there is frequently no discriminatory intent underlying the
adoption of seniority and testing practices, or a wide variety of other
objective and apparently neutral conditions to hire and promotion.
These conditions are possibly the most important contemporary ob-
stacles to the employment and promotion of qualified black work-
ers. 279
Hence, the Court found "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability." 280 By thus insisting on a strict demonstration of relevance for
criterion shown to be obstacles to the protected class, the Court sought to cull
out the effects of a history of societal discrimination without abandoning
either the societal value in qualified workers or the individual value in fair
individualized decision-making.
The proposed extension of the definition of discrimination likewise rep-
resents both a further step in the progression toward equal employment op-
portunity and a continuation of previous values. Like the previous steps, it
helps deal with an important proof problem, the frequent lack of a compara-
tive standard. But, perhaps more importantly, it advances the goal of effective
enforcement by addressing another manifestation of societal discrimination,
which forms a barrier to equal employment opportunity for historically disad-
2 " Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); McDonnell Douglas v.
Green. 41 1 U.S. 792 (1973). See Strangers in Paradise, supra note 153: Strangers No
More, supra note 223. But .set Furtico Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978):
Sweeney v. Board of Truslees of Keene Slate College. 99 S. (.:t. 295 (1978).
27" Cuiper Seniority Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Ap-
proach to Objective Criteria of Hiring awl Promotion. 82 HAIM L. REv. 1598. 1671) (1969).
Ste also H. H11,1,, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 42-47 (1977), discus-
sing the inadequacies of PEP enforcement prior to Title VII,
xxu Griggs v. fluke Power Co., 4111 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
January 19801	 SEX DISCRIMINATION	 407
vantaged groups. 2E11 And even more clearly than in the disparate impact
case, the essence of the concept is a direct continuation of the principles of
equal opportunity and fair treatment. When an employer subjects a woman to
adverse consequences for failing to conform to a dysfunctional stereotype,
that woman is being judged according to criteria over which she has no con-
trol. She is, moreover, doomed to play a part in reinforcing the vitality of
such criteria in her own eyes, the eyes of other women, and in the eyes of her
employer and co-workers. 282 Decisions resulting from stereotypically based
role expectations thus violate the merit principle, first, by diverting attention
from consideration of merit, and second, by distorting the perception neces-
sary to "merit" evaluations. At a time when our legal system appears to be
insisting on a strict application of the merit princiPle, 283 it is incumbent on
the system to develop concepts that will maximize the workability of that prin-
ciple.
C. Objections to the Theory
Two objections may be posed to the additional concept of discrimination
suggested here. First, it may he argued that the concept does not offer a
standard capable of judicial application. Second, it may be claimed that the
concept provides little additional protection to women since the plaintiffs will
rarely be able to garner the proof necessary to make out a claim under this
approach.
The first objection has been raised most notably by justice (then judge)
Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc. 284 as a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation. judge Stevens there read the majority's invali-
2 " Particularly in certain areas of employment, men may also he foreclosed
from employment opportunities (Inc to sex-based role expectations which result from a
history of differential treatment. See. e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
311 F. Sum). 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (being female was blot] for employment as flight
attendant), reed, 442 F.2d 385 (5th C:ir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
282 The Court has already recognized in the unequal treatment context that
"IpIractices that classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve
traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals, -
and thus offend the basic policy of Title VII, Los Angeles Dept. of Water 8; Power v.
Manha•t, 435 U.S. 702. 709 (1078). The self-perpetuating quality ()I' statutory generali-
zations based on role-typing also appears to be a factor in their condemnation on equal
protection grounds. See, e.g.. Stallion v. Stanton. 421 U.S. 7 (1975): Orr v. Orr, 99 S.
(.:t. 1102 (1979): Regents of the Univ. of Calif', v. Bakke, 438 U.S, 265 (1078): United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-174 (1977) (Brennan J., concurring).
2 " See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (11178); Lige v.
Town of Montclair. 72 N.J. 5 (197(i).
'" .1
 444 F.2(.1 1194 (7th (:ir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). It was primarily
this opinion which caused NOW representatives to testify in opposition to Justice
Stevens confirmation. See Nomination if John Paul Stevens to Be a justice of the Supreme
Court: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. 9<ith Cong.. 1st
Sess. 78 (1975) (Testimony of Margaret Drachsler). Perhaps because of this exposure
Justice Stevens' actual performance has shown far more understanding of the nature
of sex discrimination than feminists anticipated. See Note. The Emerging Constitutional
Jurisprudence qi Justice Stevens, '16 U. Cto, L. Rev. 157. 206-217 (1078).
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dation of a no-marriage rule for stewardesses as turning not on the denial of
"employment opportunities of one sex as opposed to the other," but rather on
"whether the [challenged] rule is an irrational impediment derived from a
stereotyped attitude toward females." 285 Arguing both from the language of
the statute and its objectives, Judge Stevens rejected this test as untenable:
I am unable ... to find any guidelines in the language of § 703 (a)
(1) for differentiating between irrational stereotypes and reasonable
requirements. Even assuming arguendo that great deference should
be accorded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, I
do not believe Congress intended to to entrust the Commission with
authority to draw such lines. In the long run, I believe justice will be
served and the objectives of the legislation best accomplished by ap-
plying the simple comparative standard suggested by the language of
the statute. The benefits of an objective standard will be shared by
those enforcing the statute and those faced with problems of com-
pliance. 286
The short answer to Judge Stevens's conviction that distinguishing the argu-
ment that the concept of impermissible does not provide a judicially manage-
able standard is that the courts themselves 'have perceived no difficulty in
recognizing and rejecting stereotypical rationales when they appear within the
frame-work of existing concepts of discrimination. Courts have consistently
invalidated practices that perpetuate sex-based stereotypes when the practice
overtly differentiates between the treatment of the two sexes. 287 In such
285
 444 F.2d at 1205. It is. however, highly questionable whether this was the
test that the majority in fact utilized. It would appear that the majority saw the evil as
differential treatment:
Viewing the class of United's married employees, it is clear that United has
contravened Section 703(a)(I) by applying one standard for men and one
for women .... Concededly. the marital status rule applicable to steward-
esses has been applied to no male employee, whatever his position. More
pointedly, no male. flight personnel, including male cabin flight attendants
or stewards, have been subject to that condition of hiring or continued
en4)1(tyment.
Id. at 1198.
Subsequent decisions would reinforce this reading of the majority's opinion. See
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (511) Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1205-1206,
" This process has occurred primarily in regard to questions of gentler dis-
crimination. probably because the "romantic paternalism. - Frontier() v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), which has characterized sex discrimination has permitted
differential treatment to he rationalized in terms which would be far less acceptable
politically and socially if explicitly articulated in the context of race discrimination. See,
e.g., City of Los Angeles Delft. of Water and Power v. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
invalidating under 'Tide VII an employer requirement that its female employees make
larger contributions to its pension fund than its male employees. The court bolstered
its argument that the use of sex-based mortality tables is unfair to individual
employees by pointing out that although actuarial studies could unquestionably iden-
tify.differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, Title VII "could
not reasonably be construed" to permit their use. Id. at 709.
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cases, the stereotype is rejected when explicitly offered to justify the unequal
treatment or when the unequal treatment is deemed to be the accidental by-
product of stereotypic thinking.
In evaluating alleged denials of the constitutional right to equal protec-
tion, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down differential treatment
schemes as "supported by no more substantial justification than 'archaic and
overbroad' generalizations or 'old notions' such as 'assumptions as to depen-
dency,' that are more consistent with 'the role-typing society has long imposed'
than with contemporary reality." 288 Thus social welfare programs have been
invalidated when based on the "sex stereotypes" that men are family bread-
winners and women are not. 28 " Fringe benefit programs connected with
military service have been invalidated as embodying similar stereotypes.'"
And domestic relations legislation that is justified only by the notion that
women will remain in the home likewise has been struck down. 2 " The Court
has, moreover, acknowledged that the " 'baggage of sexual stereotypes' that
presumes the father has the 'primary responsibility to provide a home and its
essentials' while the mother is the 'center of home and family life.' 292
Far from balking at identifying stereotypical motivation, at least in recent
equal protection cases, the Court seems to proceed by first ascertaining
whether the concededly legitimate objectives the government has proffered as
justifications for its action did in fact motivate the challenged scheme. 2 " 3
Then, if it determines that the legitimate objectives advanced by the govern-
ment were the actual motivating considerations or that they are not in fact
served by the legislative scheme, the Court has little trouble in identifying the
" Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) Tooling Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard. 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7. 10 (1975).
"I' Califano v. Nliestcott, 443 U.S. 76. (1979) (invalidating Aid to Families with
Dependent Children provision allowing assistance to families with unemployed fathers.
but not unemployed mothers); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating
Social Security Survivorship insurance provision granting benefits to all widows of cov-
ered workers but only to those widowers who were receiving over half their support
from their wives when they died); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(invalidating Social Security provisions granting childcare benefits to certain widowed
mothers. but denying them to widowed fathers).
'"" Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
2 "' Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statute permitting award of alimony to
females and not to males denied equal protection; allocation of dependent role in
family to wile is unacceptable state purpose); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)
(different ages of majority for males and females denies equal protection).
2" Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (citations omitted).
2 " 3 See. e.g.. Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. 268 (1979): Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977); Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977) upholding sex differentials in wage averaging scheme for purposes of cal-
culating Social Security benefits. "The more favorable treatment of the female wage
earner enacted here was not a result of 'archaic and overbroad generalizations* about
women or ()I' 'the role-typing society has long imposed' upon women ... such as casual
assu mptions that women are 'the weaker sex' or are more likely to be child-rearers or
dependents." Id. at 317 (citations omitted).
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scheme's actual roots as stereotypical.'" Indeed, Justice Stevens has come to
recognize, at least in the constitutional context, impediments that flow from
stereotyped attitudes toward females. Thus, once he is convinced that the
legislative action has been prompted by a legitimate end—and it's in the
care he takes in this aspect of the analysis which may distinguish him from
others on the Court 295 —he will freely find that the discrimination at issue is
"the accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females," 296
or results from "the perpetuation of a stereotyped attitude ... about the two
sexes." 2 `i 7 Conversely, the Court appears able to agree on what is not a
stereotypical reason for state action, although the members of the Court do
dispute how important a non-stereotypical interest must be and whether that
interest was in fact served in a particular case." For example, the Supreme
Court has distinguished as legitimate and non-stereotypic governmental in-
terests in highway safety,'" in administrative convenience and conservation of
the fisc, 30" and in redressing past cliscrimination 301 from stereotypic expecta-
tions about women.
Reference to stereotypical role expectations has also appeared in Title
VII decisions concerning sex discrimination, generally in the context of de-
termining whether or not a rule restricting a particular job to one gender
constitutes the type of bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) permitted by
1
" 4 See Calilano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stan-
ton v. Stanton. 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
'"' At least when the nature of the classification is questionable, ,justice Stevens
appears particularly insistent that the legislature actually have meant a rule resulting in
disparate treatment to have served the interest put forward by the government at
argument. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 221 (1977); (Stevens, J. concurring);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 243 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88. 103 (1976).
' 1 " Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (re-
jecting stereotype of females as dependents).
2 " Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 0.5 (Stevens, .1., concurring) (rejecting
stereotype that 18-21 year old females considered more mature than males in same
age bracket).
2"
 See, e.g.. separate opinions in Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) and
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). Difficulties in deriving and applying a con-
stitutional standard of review need Inn concern us here, since they turn primarily on
questions of allocating decision-making between those organs of government seen as
democratic and those seen as non-democratic. To the extent that the Court utilizes-a
constitutional test which requires it to ascertain whether the non-stereotypic state end
was in fact the legislature's real reason for utilizing the challenged classification, the
constitutional inquiry bears a superficial resemblance to the inquiry into actual motiva-
tion behind an adverse employment. decision which would be required under the test
proposed here. That the first is a legal inquiry into legislative history and the other a
factual inquiry into events would seem to undercut the significance of the resemblance.
In any event, the feasibility of carrying out the second is discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 327-36, infra.
29" .See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
3"" Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
uu Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
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Section 703(e) of the Act. 3"2 Although there has been fairly extensive litiga-
tion under Section 703(e), 3" the Supreme Court has dealt with the bfoq ques-
tion only twice. The first case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 304 took a broad
view of the type of consideration that might be a bfoq. It concerned a policy
of denying jobs to female applicants with preschool age children, while males
with preschool age children were employed. Known primarily for its holding
that such a rule does amount to sex-based discrimination inasmuch as it dis-
tinguishes between similarly-situated workers, the case also suggested that the
policy might be justified as a bfoq if it could be shown statistically that con-
flicts between job and child care were generally more relevant to job perform-
ance for women than for men. 3 "5
 However, in returning to the question
eight years later in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 306 the Supreme Court made clear - it
would follow a number of lower court rulings that had interpreted the bfoq
exception far more narrowly. 3 " Despite some variation in verbal formula-
tions, the Court found the lower court holdings had a common core that
turns on the notion of stereotyping: "The federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man
on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." 3" Moreover,
given EEOC's consistency in interpreting Section 703(e), the Court specifically
approved and relied on the agency's guideline, which calls for a narrow in-
3"2 11 is theoretically possible for courts to pass on stereotypes in the process of
determining whether neutral employment rules having a disparate impact are justified
by business necessity. For example, a school board rule denying employment to unwed
parents will disqualify women disproportionately given the relative difficulties in detec-
tion. If the employer seeks to justify such a rule in terms of providing a "positive role
model" for students, it may become apparent that the model is aimed at teaching
female students not to get "caught" or to fill their traditional role as "good girls. - It is
likely, however, that an employer will define business necessity in neutral terms, and
thus it is to be expected that stereotypical assumptions will rarely be before the courts
in disparate impact cases. since both the rule and the justification will be stated neu-
trally. Rather, as noted, stereotypical assumptions have been discussed primarily in
connection with claims that facially discriminatory employment policies constitute .
1)1'00 within the meaning of Section 703(e). Since the bfoq exception to the prohibi-
tion on disparate treatment discrimination does not apply to racial classifications, it is
understandable that there are few Title VII cases dealing with racial stereotypes.
Stereotypes may also appear in an employer's efforts to rebut prima facie showings
of discrimination based on statistics. See Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n., 458 F. Supp.
1147, 1163-66 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
Discriminatory stereotyping has on occasion been identified in the racial context.
For example, black women who, having been told "colored folks arc hired to clean
because they clean better," were required to do heavy cleaning when their white co-
workers were not, were held to have shown discrimination under Title VII "whatever
the motivation of the ... defendant. - Slack v. Havens, 7 FEP Cas, 885. 887, 890 (S.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th (ir. 1975).
3"3 See, e.g. , Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 n.17 (1977) and cases
cited therein.
3°4 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
	3"5
	 at 544.
31" 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
	3"7
	 at 334.
3" Id. at 333.
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terpretation of the bfoq exception and which indicates inter alia that the ex-
ception does not apply where the refusal to employ is based on stereotypical
notions."9
There is, of course, dispute over whether having indentified a standard
that barred stereotypes, the Court properly applied this standard in the
Dothard case. At issue in the case was an Alabama rule barring females from
"contact positions" in maximum-security male prisons. Noting the special
-jungle atmosphere" in the Alabama prisons and the testimony of the plain-
tiff's own witnesses indicating that women could not necessarily work safely in
the maximum security section,"" the majority dismissed the contention that
the exclusion of woman was based on stereotyped assumptions: [i]n this envi-
ronment of violence and disorganization, it would be an oversimplification to
characterize [the rule] as an exercise in 'romantic paternalism.' "3"
justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that the perception that the
use of female guards posed an additional threat to prison security had no
basis in fact, but rather reflected "precisely the type of generalized bias
against women that the Court agrees Title VII was intended to outlaw. " 312
The dissent cites persuasively to the record, 313 and is probably right on the
merits. But its disagreement with the majority is over whether there is a non-
stereotypical reason for a sex-exclusive hiring rule, that is, whether the essence
of the business Operation would be undermined by not hiring (males) exclu-
sively," 314
 not over the ability of courts to handle the concept of stereotypes.
On the contrary, the case as a whole seems to reflect that the judiciary is
capable of rejecting rules or statutes motivated by stereotypical assump-
tions." 5
That the courts perceive no difficulty in attributing certain discrimination
to stereotypical role expectations does not prove that they are equipped to do
so. It still must be shown that the courts have guidelines for differentiating
irrational stereotypes from reasonable requirements. Nevertheless, it is obvi-
ously significant that the Supreme Court in particular has found the notion of
3" Id. at 334 n.19, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a).
310 Id. at 336.
3 " id. at 335. The court's holding would seem limited not only to prisons but
more particularly to the Alabama prisons in view of its further notations that Ala-
bama's prisons are not typical and that female guards can and have been used success-
fully in all-male penitentiaries elsewhere. See id. at 336 n.23.
312 Id. at 343.
313 Id. at 343-44, 344 n.2: "The witnesses claimed that women guards are not
strict disciplinarians: that they are physically less capable of protecting themselves and
subduing unruly inmates; that inmates take advantage of them as they did their
mothers, while male guards are strong father figures who easily maintain discipline
214 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971) (emphasis in the original), cited with apparent approval. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
315
 indeed, given the law's role in establishing such cultural assumptions, the
courts may feel obligated to assist in rooting out and eliminating stereotypes. See
Johnson & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675 (1971); POWERS, supra note 270.
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stereotypes to be a feasible concept; and even more significant that it is a
concept the Court is willing to employ in the constitutional as well as the
statutory sphere. For, after all, correcting erroneous constitutional interpreta-
tions is far more cumbersome and potentially debilitating to the judiciary than
correcting errors in statutory construction. 316
Such judicial willingness probably reflects a widespread consensus that
class-based classifications have a settled and generally accepted content. There
are two interrelated aspects to this content: the attribution of certain charac-
teristics to group members, and the expectation that certain behavior and cer-
tain relations are appropriate for certain groups. The interrelation of these
two aspects is apparent in the societal assignment of particular characteristics
to males and females in order to enhance their performance in traditional sex
roles. 3 " A series of studies have in fact found a high degree of consensus
about the differing characteristics of men and women, even across groups
which differ in sex, age, religion, marital status and educational leve1. 3 I 8 Thus
the characteristics valued in men are said to reflect a "competency cluster,"
entailing "competence, rationality and assertion," while female-valued traits
comprise a "warmth and expressiveness" cluster, involving social skills and
graces, and warmth and emotional support. 319 The stereotypically masculine
person is aggressive, ambitious, analytical, assertive, athletic, competitive, dom-
inant, forceful, individualistic, self-reliant, a strong personality, independent, a
risk-taker, self-sufficient, and a leader. 3 " The stereotypically feminine per-
son is affectionate, cheerful, childlike, compassionate, eager to soothe hurt
feelings, flatterable, gentle, gullible, loyal, sensitive to the needs of others,
loves children, shy, soft-spoken, sympathetic, tender, understanding, warm,
and yielding. 32 '
Expectations as to behavior and relations may be summed up in women's
cultural mandate "to expect men to be the providers of economic means and
prestige." 322 Two traditional variations on the dependency role are available
to fulfill this cultural mandate, and indeed Western attitudes about woman
and sexuality have split woman in two: "The housewife and loving mother on
31 " See the concluding lines of Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Weber,
voting with the majority to uphold a private race-conscious affirmative action plan
under Title VII: "And if the Court has misperceive(' the political will, it has the assur-
ance that because the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so
chooses." United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
3 ' 7 See generally O'LEARY, supra note 40, at 831.
3" See generally id. at 813. summarizing the available literature and, in particu-
lar, Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson & Rosencrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A
Current Appraisal, 28 J. Soc. ISSUES 59 (1972), listing 41 sex-role traits and behaviors.
Given this research, it is likely that a court can call on expert witnesses to assist it in
handling the questions that are likely to arise in litigation under the proposed theory.
319 Id.
320 Bern, The Measurement of Psychological Andrageny, 42 J. CONSULTING & CLIN-
ICAL PSYCH. 155 (1974).
321 Id.
322 COSER & ROKOFF, supra note 35, at 540.
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the one hand; the exotic lover, temptress of man, on the other [hand]." 323 Of
these two options, the first is rewarded by greater social approbation, al-
though the latter may reap greater material rewards. To the extent that there
is a third stereotype of woman, it would appear to be reserved for those who
choose activities carrying them beyond traditional roles serving men and who
thereby lose their femininity. 324
In rejecting these traditional stereotypes, whether through the applica-
tion of constitutional or statutory principles, the courts have tended to deal
with trait attribution and behavioral expectation in slightly different ways. In
the case of trait attribution, rather than permit decisions that are based on an
assumption that all women have a particular characteristic, the courts gener-
ally will require that the individual in question be allowed to demonstrate that
she does not have that characteristic. For example, rather than disqualifying
all women as weak, a particular job applicant must be allowed to show she
personally is strong enough. 325
 With regard to rules embodying assumptions
about appropriate behavior for women, the courts generally require that the
individual be allowed to elect her own course. For example, it is impermissible
to exclude all women from a particular job on the ground that it is too
dangerous for them; rather the individual woman must be permitted to make
that judgment for herself. 326
 These refinements suggest once again that the
courts are capable of identifying and manipulating stereotypes.
The major practical objection to developing a fourth concept of discrimi-
nation along the lines proposed here is simply that it is pointless since it will
only rarely be possible to show that adverse employment decisions are based
on stereotypical expectations. This is not necessarily to say that decisions are
not in fact made this way, but rather to express skepticism that decision-
makers will be so overtly sexist in justifying their actions. 327
 Fairly recent
evidence does exist to show that managers continue to base personnel deci-
sions on stereotypical expectations, particularly where there is no similarly-
323
 V.L. BULLOUGU & B. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX 49 (1974). See also
Clifton. McGrath & Wick. Stereotypes of Women: A Single Categiny?. 2 SEX ROLES 135
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ClivroN. McGRATit & Wick], who argue that despite the
suggestions of sociologists that these two roles may be complementary. these roles May
in fact be mutually exclusive. Id. at 144-45. See also Fox, supra note 63; Seidenberg.
The Myth of the -Evil-
 Female as Embodied in the Law, 2 .1. ENvT1 L. 218 (1971).
324 CLiFTON, MC:GRATH & WICK, supra note 323 at 145.
325
 Manhari v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power. 553 F.2d 581,
586 (9th Cir. 1977). affil, 435 U.S. 702 (1978): Long v. Sapp. 502 F.2d 34. 40 (5th Cir.
1974): Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219. 1225 (9th Cir. 1971): Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711. 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
°' See, e.g.. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.. 408 F.2d 228. 236 (5th
Cir. 1969); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co.. 416 F.2d 711. 718 (7th Cir. 1969): Rosen-
feld v. Southern Pacific Co.. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 97 1 ). But see Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321. 335 (1979).
327 It is. of course. possible that proof of the decision-maker's stereotypic ex-
pectations can he gathered from third parties. even if the decision-maker is unwilling
to express such expectations officially, as for example. where the decision-maker's re-
mark to others reveal stereotypic concerns. See, e.g., Skelton v. Baliano, 424 F. Stipp.
1231 (D.D.C. 1976).
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situated male to provide a standard of comparison and thus point up the
potential for discrimination.'" So, for example, married women are not
likely to be considered for managerial positions requiring extensive travel;
employer intervention is considered inappropriate to retain valued female
employees when their husbands had an opportunity to move for a better job,
since working women are expected to give up their own jobs for the sake of
their husbands' careers; and women are more likely than men to obtain leaves
of absence for child care.'"
That employers base their decisions on such expectations, does not mean
that they will acknowledge that this is what they are doing. There is good
reason to believe that the employer will articulate some reason for the adverse
action since "to dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing
under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' " 33 ° The issue raised
here, however, is whether the justifications articulated by employers will em-
body stereotypic role expectations. The case for the utility of expanding the
definition of discrimination ultimately must rest on the belief that there are a
significant number of employers who will articulate stereotypic motivations for
their actions because they have yet to recognize the inequity, counterproduc-
tivity, and social unacceptability of such expressions. The belief that a concept
of discrimination based on stereotyping per se will prove useful is necessarily
based on personal experiences and impressions of a general level of con-
sciousness, rather than on hard data. 331
Certainly in the 1960's even "enlightened" academics had few qualms
about using comments implying a lower level of expectation for females or
noting physical traits irrelevant to the task at hand in evaluating females. 332
328
 Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes. supra note 45, at 9.
329 Rosen, Jerdee
	 Prestwich, Dual Career Marital Adjustment: Potential Effects of
Discriminatory Managerial Altitudes. 37 J. MARK. & FANI, 565-66 (1975). As the authors
point out, the last example makes it particularly clear that both women and men stand
to lose options as a result of sex role expectations: women are denied job opportunities
because their loyalty to work is questioned; and men are inhibited front participating
in family life.
"" Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567. 578 (1978). quoting
NIcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
"' In a (line when the President of the United States perceives that he is polit-
ically free to fire as too abrasive the chairperson of the National Advisory Committee
on Women and replace her with a woman whose major claim to fame is that she is the
daughter of a president, there seems to be some justification for the belief. See Dewitt.
New Head if Carter's Advisory Panel on Women, Lynda Bird Johnson Robb, N.Y. "Times, May
19, 1979, at 16, col. 1.
332 See, e.g., Luniteborg and Lillie, Sexist'? in Graduate Admissions: The Letter
Recommendation. 28 AMERICAN PsvcatoLoGisT 187 (1973). Examples of the discrimina-
tory comments found in letters of recommendation included the following:
"Pretty she's not, but pleasant and sparkly and energetic she is." "In per-
sonality she shows poise. vivacity. good humor and charm. She makes an
excellent social impression, being attractive, well-groomed. and appro-
priately dressed. 1 believe she has a fine reputation and 1 would have no
reason to question her character, morals. or emotional health. She is the
kind of women who should he encouraged to pursue graduate study. - "She
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The occasional case, as well as contemporary sociological reports, suggest that
qualms or inhibitions about articulating similarly stereotypic expressions have
yet to develop in the 1970's. So, for example, it is apparently considered ac-
ceptable to tell a female lawyer she can be laid off because her husband's
salary will suffice, 333 to inquire at length concerning the child care arrange-
ments of female job applicants, 334 or to withhold promotional opportunities
from female clericals on the assumption that they would feel "rejected" if it
were suggested that they can move on to other positions. 335 Nor is the per-
ception that it is acceptable to express such considerations surprising in view
of the stereotypes that continue to bombard us through the media. 338
It is likely, moreover, that articulating the proposed concept of discrimi-
nation will initially encourage complaints by identifying present conduct as
impermissible. The response by women to the enactment of Title VII gener-
ally as well as the response to its specific extension to sexual harassment, serve
as precedents for this prediction. 337
Another practical objection is that this additional concept of discrimina-
tion may in fact be counterproductive in that it will force employers to be
more careful about what they say, without altering their attitudes. Thus
stereotypic attitudes may be hidden in subjective evaluations that will then be
shielded from attack. 338 While it is possible to question whether this will in
fact occur, the response to this concern must ultimately be a belief that just as
there is a value in attempting to suppress overt expressions of class-based
antipathy, there is a value in attempting to suppress overt expressions of
stereotypic role expectations. This belief in turn rests on two premises previ-
is a quiet yet personable young woman. rather neat and attractive though
not likely to unduly distract male graduates." "She is task oriented, self-
starting, non-neurotic. An unusual girl graduate student." "She is an att.rac-
tive young lady with a delightful, pleasing personality and genteel manner.
She has a great deal of promise for a career in psychology, although her
recent marriage may deter her. She is very attractive in appearance and
personality and her character is exemplary."
Id. at 188.
333 See Complaint in Goldring v. N.J. Dept. of the Public Advocate,Office of the
Public Defender. Case No. EM 14-WG-I5270-C. filed with the New Jersey Division on
Civil Rights (March 28, 1979) (alleging inter alia that supervisor told furloughed
female attorney that she was laid la despite her seniority because they got two pay
checks in her house).
3 '4 As a teacher identified with "women's issues," I am regularly advised of
female law students being subjected to such inquiries in interviews.
135 KANTER, Pipit] note Oh, at 87. See also Goodwin, Commenteny—Opporiunities for
Women in Small Business, 22 Bus. & Ecox. Rev. 2,' 5 (1976) reporting on survey of
eastern businessmen in 1974-1975 in which some businessmen frankly admitted it had
never occurred to them to ask women whether they wished to take on extra respon-
sibilities.
331; See US, Commission on Civil Rights, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE Srr 1-48.
(1977): see generally It. Coffma n, GENDER ADVERTISEMENTS ( 1979).




concern is heightened by recent decisions showing an increased judi-
cial willingness to defer to employer's subjective judgments. Sec note 50 supra.
January 1980)	 SEX DISCRIMINATION	 417
ously mentioned: (1) that, as in the case of class-based animus, the articulation
of impermissibly stereotypic motivations is in and of itself bad; (2) that the
process of recognizing, so as to eliminate, the expression of stereotypic role
expectations is itself beneficial. As already discussed, the damage that flows
from the expression of such role expectations is two-fold—by their repetition,
these expressions confirm the employer's belief in their validity and legiti-
macy, while at the same time arousing the worker's role conflict. 339
 Objection
to such expressions is not merely aesthetic; the expressions promote specific
roles and thereby limit employment opportunity. 34° Obviously, it is most de-
sirable to prevent altogether the employer from making employment decisions
on the basis of stereotypic expectations; but should the outcome fall somewhat
short of this goal, there is still something to be gained. If employers must
catch themselves expressing stereotypic justifications for their actions, they will
inevitably educate themselves regarding the role such expectations play in
their decision-making and may also pause to reconsider whether without that
expectation their decision can be justified.
CONCLUSION
Numerous studies show what we know as a matter of common knowl-
edge: stereotypic expectations based on a person's sex or race permeate our
judgments about individual capabilities and interests, and prevent us from
accurately evaluating individuals on the basis of merit. Moreover, every time
an employment decision is made on the basis of role expectations, the
stereotypes are reinforced, in the minds of both the employer and employee,
"" See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
" 1 " lit this sense, the articulation of stereotypic role expectations is akin to cer-
tain insidious non-neutral uses of language and unlike other less damaging ones. In
the words of Robin Lakoff:
Linguistic imbalances are worthy of study because they bring into sharper
focus real-world imbalances and inequities. They are clues that some ex-
ternal situation needs changing, rather than items one should seek to
change directly. A competent doctor tries to eliminate the germs that. cause
measles, rather than trying to bleach the red out with 'peroxide. I em-
phasize this point because it seems to be currently fashionable to try, first,
to attack the disease by attempting to obliterate the external symptoms:
and, second, to attack even instance of linguistic sexual inequity, rather
than selecting those that reflect a real disparity in social treatment, not
mere grammatical nonparallelism. We should be attempting to single out.
t hose linguistic uses that, by implication and innuendo. demean the mem-
bers of one group or another, and should be seeking to make speakers of
English aware of the psychological damage such forms do.
R. LAkorr, LA.Nouncr, AND 'WOMEN'S PLACE 43 ( U)75). Lakoff thus distinguishes be-
tween objections to non-neutral words for "human being" (i.e., "man" and "mankind")
and the non-neutral use of words like "mistress" and "professional":
While the former usage' is related to the fact that men have been the
writers and the doers, I don't think it by itself specifies a particular and
demeaning role for women, as the special uses of mistress or professional,
to give a few examples, do. It is not insidious in the same way: it does not
indicate to little girls how they are expected to behave.
Id. at 44-45.
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Nevertheless, our anti-discrimination laws as they currently are interpreted
outlaw sexual stereotypes only if they are connected with outright. hostility,
unequal treatment, or arc offered to justify neutral rules having a disparate
impact on women.
This article has argued that an additional concept Of discrimination is
required. Under this concept it would be sufficient to show that the adverse
employment. decision was based on an expectation that, women should con-
form to a certain pattern of behavior whether or not that expectation was
based on hostility, and whether or not there is a similarly-situated male who
received different treatment.
The recognition of discrimination as adverse decisions based on
stereotypes per se means focusing on the effects of acts, not on the intent of
the actor. For instance, we need not worry about whether the worker who
subjects a subordinate or co-worker to sexual harassment was really attracted
to her, as some claim, or whether, as others believe, he was seeking to put her
down. What matters is that sexual harassment serves to remind both the
employee and the employer, that as a woman she is still seen as a sexual
object rather than a contributing worker. As such, sexual harassment is an
obstacle to equal employment opportunity.
This focus on effect, not intent, is in keeping with statutory interpreta-
tions in the "neutral rule" context and with the great purposes of our anti-
discrimination laws. We do not seek to blame employers who use tests that are
not shown to be job related and that have a disparate impact on protected
classes. Rather, we seek to eliminate those practices that artificially deprive
society of the contributions of qualified workers. Similarly. we should seek to
eliminate stereotypes that interfere with the employer's proper evaluation of
merit and the worker's willingness to participate in traditional and non-
traditional work, in order to enhance societal and individual achievement. A
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